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ABSTRACT
When courts review agency action, they typically accord agency deci-
sions a degree of deference.  As many courts and commentators have recog-
nized, the law in this area is complicated because it features numerous
standards of review, including several distinct regimes for evaluating agen-
cies’ legal interpretations.  There is, however, at least one important respect
in which uniformity rather than variety prevails: the applicable standards of
review do not vary depending on which court is reviewing the agency.
Whichever standard governs a particular case—Chevron, Skidmore, or
something else—all courts in the judicial hierarchy are supposed to apply
that same standard.
This Article proposes instead that the law should take into account the
varying institutional circumstances and competencies of courts at different
positions in the judicial hierarchy.  More specifically, lower courts should be
more deferential to agencies than should higher courts.  The argument
divides into two parts.  Part I, which presents the theoretical case, lays out a
series of common rationales for judicial deference and explains how those
rationales actually support a regime of hierarchically variable deference.
Part II then turns to questions of institutional implementation.  As it turns
out, our system already manifests a few features of hierarchically variable
deference, though it does not do so openly.  Thus, this Article helps to explain
and justify some current practices.  Prescriptively, Part II suggests a number
of ways in which the judicial system could more systematically implement a
regime of hierarchically variable review.  One possibility is that different
courts should employ somewhat different doctrinal standards, but hierarchi-
cal variation can also manifest itself through non-doctrinal means, such as
through decisions about how to allocate jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
The law of judicial review of agency action is marked by complex-
ity and variety.  Depending on the situation, federal courts will apply
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one of several distinct standards of review.  The multiplicity of stan-
dards reflects, in part, the fact that administrative agencies do several
different things, such as make factual findings, exercise policymaking
discretion, and interpret governing statutes and regulations.  Yet the
doctrinal complexity persists even when we narrow the field and con-
sider only judicial review of agency interpretation.  Prevailing doctrine
requires, depending on the circumstances, that reviewing courts
either defer strongly to the agency’s interpretation (“Chevron defer-
ence”), defer a bit (“Skidmore deference”), employ some other defer-
ence regime, or defer not at all.1  As the Supreme Court has admitted
in describing its approach to fashioning these standards of review, the
Court has often chosen “to tailor deference to variety” rather than “to
limit and simplify.”2
There is at least one respect, however, in which uniformity rather
than variety prevails: the applicable standard of deference does not
vary depending on which court is reviewing the agency.  Rather,
whatever the relevant standard happens to be, the same standard is
supposed to be applied by all courts within the judicial hierarchy.3
For instance, if a particular agency interpretation merits “Skidmore def-
erence” from the Supreme Court, it merits the same type of deference
1 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (distin-
guishing between “full Chevron deference” and “the less deferential Skidmore stan-
dard” governing review of agency statutory interpretations); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997) (setting forth the standard governing review of an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own regulations); Ala. Rivers Alliance v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
325 F.3d 290, 296–97 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that the court exercises de novo review
when the agency is interpreting a statute the agency is not charged with administer-
ing); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–1120 (2008) (listing still more deference regimes).  The two
leading deference regimes take their names from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944), respectively; the various standards are described more fully in Sec-
tion I.A, infra.
2 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236–37 (2001).
3 See, e.g., id. at 234–39 (holding that an agency ruling was entitled to Skidmore
deference and remanding for the lower court to apply that standard); United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999) (“Like other courts, the Court of Inter-
national Trade must, when appropriate, give regulations Chevron deference.”); Am.
Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e apply the familiar
standards of review enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Chevron and Mead].”); Fish-
ermen’s Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e generally
review the agency’s action from the same position as that of the district court . . . .”);
White & Case LLP v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 22 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (modifying the
court’s prior law because “the Supreme Court has refined the approach to statutory
construction and judicial deference that courts must follow”).
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from the federal courts of appeals and district courts.  Put differently,
the law of judicial deference is hierarchically uniform.
There is nothing inevitable about embracing this type of uniform-
ity.  Scholars of statutory interpretation have begun to suggest that
interpretation need not be a homogeneous activity that all courts per-
form the same way.4  If one were to step back from current law’s
apparent insistence on homogeneity, doctrines of deference would
seem like natural candidates for variation across courts.  That is
because doctrines of deference are based largely on institutional con-
siderations, in particular the divergent roles and competencies of
courts on the one hand and administrative agencies on the other.5
But “courts” are a diverse bunch, and within that category one finds
important variations in institutional competencies, functions, and
contexts.  Because of these cross-court differences, the various ratio-
nales supporting deference apply with varying degrees of force
depending on which court is at issue.  More specifically, the rationales
for deference are more persuasive as one moves lower down the judi-
cial hierarchy.  Cross-court differences thus provide a reason—to be
weighed against countervailing considerations, of course—to tailor
deference doctrines so that they track the institutional circumstances
of various reviewing courts.
In highlighting the potential for variation within the judicial hier-
archy, this Article contributes to the broader theoretical debate over
the optimal tailoring of deference doctrine: which of the many dissim-
ilarities across contexts—across different courts, different kinds of
agencies,6 and individual cases—should the judicial system take into
4 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpre-
tation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012) (exploring whether elected judges and
appointed judges should use different methods); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy
and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012)
(considering the relationship between a court’s place in the judicial structure and
interpretive methodology); Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 897 (2013) (examining statutory interpretation in local courts); Jeffrey A. Poja-
nowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013) (examining
whether state courts with general common law powers should diverge from federal
courts with respect to interpretive method).
5 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institu-
tional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 411, 413–16, 444–46; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 925–32 (2003).
6 Several Supreme Court Justices recently debated whether independent agen-
cies should receive less deference than executive agencies. Compare FCC v. Fox Tele-
vision Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the
FCC’s status as an independent agency “makes it all the more important that courts
review its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the
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account and which should be disregarded in the name of simplicity
and uniformity?  This Article contends that differences across courts
are important enough that a well-designed system of judicial review
should, in some form, take them into account.
Supposing that hierarchical variation were justified, what would
the resulting system look like?  To preview, there are several possibili-
ties.  One possibility is that the lower courts should defer more than
they do under current practice, but another possibility is that the
Supreme Court should defer less.  Further, despite the judicial sys-
tem’s official embrace of uniformity, it could be that the system
already displays hierarchical variation in practice, with lower courts
deferring more than the Supreme Court.  If so, all courts could be
behaving roughly correctly already, and no adjustment to the status
quo would be needed.
The Article’s examination of hierarchically heterogeneous defer-
ence divides into two parts.  Part I presents the theoretical case for
hierarchical variation.  It lays out the typical rationales for judicial def-
erence and explains how each rationale, upon reflection, has a hierar-
chically variable character.  Part II then turns to the matter of
institutional implementation.  That is, if the justification for deference
is stronger in lower courts than in higher courts, how (if at all) might
the judicial system actually implement a scheme of variable defer-
ence?  As it turns out, our system already does manifest a few features
of hierarchically variable deference, though it does not do so openly.
Thus, this Article helps to explain and justify some current practices,
perhaps even reconciling us to some features of current law that oth-
erwise seem problematic.  Further, in a more prescriptive mode, Part
II suggests a number of ways in which the judicial system could more
systematically implement a regime of hierarchically variable review.
Impediments and countervailing values are acknowledged and consid-
ered.  It is a mistake to assume that variable deference can be imple-
mented only through doctrine—that is, requiring different courts to
use different legal standards.  Although doctrine is one means of
implementation, deference can manifest itself in other ways too, such
as through decisions about how to allocate jurisdiction.  In fact, non-
law”), and id. at 540–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (apparently suggesting that the FCC’s
status as an independent agency restricts its ability to change its views), with id. at
523–26 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (rejecting any relevant difference between
independent and executive agencies); see also Randolph J. May, Defining Deference
Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 451–53
(2006) (arguing that independent agencies should receive less deference from
courts).
732 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
doctrinal implementations of deference have some advantages in
terms of workability and, perhaps, efficacy.
Before proceeding, two notes regarding scope are in order.  First,
the subject is federal court review of federal agencies.  Issues regard-
ing state standards of review and interactions between the state and
federal regulatory systems are interesting, especially considering that
many state judges are elected, but those issues are not taken up here.7
Second, courts review a variety of agency activities, and the activity
primarily at issue here is agency legal interpretation: e.g., What is a
“stationary source” within the context of the Clean Air Act?; Does the
Endangered Species Act prohibit private landowners from chopping
down trees if doing so destroys the habitat of endangered animals?;
Does a worker’s oral objection to workplace overtime violations count
as a “complaint” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act?; and so
on.8  Courts and scholars have devoted a tremendous amount of intel-
lectual energy to thinking about judicial review of agency interpreta-
tion,9 and so it makes sense to engage with that body of doctrine and
scholarship.  Nonetheless, various types of agency action blend into
each other, such that it is often hard to maintain a strict separation
between legal interpretation on the one hand and policy discretion or
even fact-finding on the other.  Therefore, review of agency discretion
and fact-finding is discussed at several points below.  The considera-
tions that support hierarchical deference in the context of legal inter-
pretation are mostly applicable to those other contexts as well.
I. THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR HIERARCHICALLY
VARIABLE DEFERENCE
This Article takes as a given that some amount of judicial defer-
ence to agency views is appropriate, even on matters of law.10  The
7 See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 4, at 1277–82 (exploring the relationship between
judicial elections and deference doctrines); D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for
Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 YALE L.J. 373 (2009) (discussing state
courts and Chevron deference); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond,
121 YALE L.J. 534, 574–622 (2011) (discussing state administrative implementation of
federal statutory programs).
8 The examples just given are drawn, respectively, from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984), Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 690–92 (1995), and Kas-
ten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329–30, 1335 (2011).
9 As an illustration, searches of electronic databases show that over two hundred
law review articles refer to Chevron in their titles alone.
10 To adopt this starting point is not to deny that one can challenge the propriety
of judicial deference, or at least strong forms of it, at the level of first principles. See,
2013] hierarchically  variable  deference 733
concern here is how best to calibrate deference, in particular whether
deference should vary systematically from court to court.  This part of
the Article very briefly examines the existing law of deference, which
is supposed to be uniform across courts, and then, more importantly,
shows how the rationales supporting deference actually support a
hierarchically variable regime.  The aim is to provide a sort of prima
facie theoretical case for hierarchical heterogeneity, which Part II can
then translate into institutional form.
A. Brief Summary of Deference Doctrines
The law of deference to administrative agencies is complex and,
in certain particulars, still uncertain and evolving.  To set the stage for
the argument that follows, a concise summary of a few of the leading
deference regimes will suffice.  Some additional details will be added
where appropriate as the analysis proceeds.11
The most famous and explicit deference regime comes from
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,12 which
directs courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations when con-
e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
tive State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 476–99, 511–26 (1989) (criticizing deference on
separation-of-powers grounds).  One can also mount more particularized challenges
to the legitimacy of specific deference doctrines. E.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 617–19, 631–80 (1996) (questioning the Seminole Rock doctrine of deference to
agency interpretations of the agency’s own rules on structural constitutional
grounds).
11 For more detailed treatments of the doctrinal landscape, see A GUIDE TO JUDI-
CIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES chs. 3–8 (John F. Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., 2005); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 155–273,
523–55 (5th ed. 2010); and 2 id. at 975–1058.  My summary of deference regimes
requires a few caveats.  An empirical study of the Supreme Court’s deference cases
published in 2008 by Eskridge and Baer reveals the following: (1) there are a number
of distinct (though practically similar) deference doctrines besides the most famous
ones, (2) courts often rely on agency views without citing a specific deference doc-
trine, and (3) independent judicial judgment is often exercised (at least in the
Supreme Court) even when formal doctrine would call for some type of deference.
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1098–1100.  In addition, despite the elaborate dis-
tinctions drawn by the formal doctrines, there is reason to believe that the standards
tend to converge somewhat in practice. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA.
L. REV. 135, 154, 168, 186–87 (2010) (showing that agencies tend to prevail about
two-thirds of the time regardless of the standard of review).  Those who are skeptical
about whether formal doctrinal changes are very effective may prefer to implement
hierarchical deference through other means, such as jurisdiction or voting rules. See
infra subsection II.B.1.
12 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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fronted with statutory gaps or ambiguities.  More precisely, Chevron
prescribes a two-part inquiry.  The court first asks, in what has come to
be known as Chevron Step One, “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.”13  If Congress has done so, then
courts and agencies alike must obey its directive.  But if Congress has
not directly resolved the question at issue, the analysis proceeds to
Step Two, at which the courts will defer to the agency’s view as long as
it is “reasonable”—which does not require that the agency’s interpre-
tation match the one the court would adopt as a matter of indepen-
dent judgment.14
Agency interpretations come in many formats, and not all of
them are the sort of thing that can even qualify for Chevron deference.
As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Mead Corp., an
agency interpretation falls within the domain of Chevron “when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpreta-
tion claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”15  Although that is a rather uncertain test, in practice it
tends to mean that relatively formal agency actions—such as notice-
and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication—are eligible for
Chevron treatment, while lesser actions and materials—opinion letters,
agency manuals, enforcement guidelines, and the like—are not.16
Agency materials that do not display the requisite formality to
come within Chevron’s domain still get a measure of respect under the
13 Id. at 842.
14 Id. at 843–44.  There is some disagreement regarding the nature of Step Two.
On one view, Step Two addresses the substantive permissibility of the agency’s inter-
pretation—that is, whether it falls within the bounds of the statutory ambiguity that
was found to exist in Step One.  On another view, Step Two is instead more process-
based, scrutinizing the reasoning process that generated the interpretation. See Ron-
ald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253
(1997) (describing various approaches and advocating an approach similar to the
second view just described); see also infra text accompanying note 158 (discussing the
view that Chevron has only one step).
15 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  The doctrine con-
cerning the preconditions for entering Chevron’s domain has come to be known as
Chevron “Step Zero.” See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain,
89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006).
16 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31; Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87
(2000).  To say that an agency action is eligible for Chevron treatment, or comes
within Chevron’s domain, does not mean that it will pass Chevron’s two-step test and
receive deference.  Here we are merely discussing which deference test is applicable
to a particular type of agency action.
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separate deference regime of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.17 Skidmore recog-
nized that agency views “constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance.”18  The force of that guidance depends on the balance
of a handful of pragmatic factors: “the thoroughness evident in [the
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”19
Another deference regime—Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference—
concerns an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.  According
to the standard formulation, the agency’s view prevails unless it is
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”20
The foregoing doctrines of deference to agency interpretations
are judicially crafted, and they are a bit hard to square with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which directs that the reviewing
court “shall decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions.”21  Several of the APA’s standards of
review governing other kinds of agency decisions more obviously con-
template deference.  One such standard is the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard, a sort of catch-all that applies to judicial review of
various agency activities including the exercise of discretion and infor-
mal fact-finding.22  Although this standard requires agencies to
17 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to elimi-
nate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference
whatever its form.”).
18 323 U.S. at 140.
19 Id.; see also id. at 139 (referring to the “specialized experience and broader
investigations and information” available to the agency as a factor supporting
deference).
20 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (applying the same standard even though the
agency’s interpretation was presented in a brief rather than through preexisting regu-
latory guidance).
21 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  The usual way to reconcile judicial deference with the
text of the APA—and with the judiciary’s broader duty to determine the law—has
been to say that Congress has delegated some interstitial lawmaking power to agen-
cies; the “question of law” for the court then becomes whether the agency has
remained within the delegated territory, not whether the agency has found the single
correct meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Admin-
istrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6, 25–28 (1983) (justifying judicial deference along
those lines).
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to set aside agency action found to
be “arbitrary [or] capricious”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Discre-
tion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
11, at 177 (discussing the standard’s application to agency exercises of discretion);
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engage in reasoned decision-making, it does not permit courts to sub-
stitute their views for the agency’s expert judgments.23  Similarly,
agency factual determinations made in the context of formal hearings
are reviewed only to see if they are supported by “substantial evi-
dence,” a standard more lenient than de novo review.24  Although
these statutory standards of review are not usually called deference
regimes, forms of deference are in effect what they prescribe.
B. Rationales for Deference—and Their Court-Specific Features
No single argument for deference neatly explains all of the
existing doctrine and satisfies all commentators.  Various rationales
for deference have been advanced, and it may be that the most suc-
cessful defenses rely on a blend of several overlapping and mutually
reinforcing considerations.25  The interesting feature explored here is
that the force of the various rationales varies from court to court.  In
some instances the force of a given rationale varies greatly across
courts, though in other instances the variation is less marked.  The
discussion begins where the argument for hierarchically variable def-
erence seems weakest, namely with rationales that locate deference in
congressional intent.  If the argument for variable deference can deal
successfully with congressional intent, it will be off to a very promising
start.
1. Legislative Intent to Delegate Authority
The legislature creates both the agencies and the statutes they
administer, so one would suppose that the courts’ method of supervis-
ing how the agencies implement the statutes ought to depend prima-
rily on the legislature’s desires as well.  Indeed, the Supreme Court
has often linked deference to congressional intent, notably in Mead,
Jim Rossi, Judicial Review of Issues of Fact, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 11, at 159–63 (discussing application of the standard
to agency fact-finding).
23 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (stating that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satis-
factory explanation for its action,” but “a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency”).
24 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); see Rossi, supra note 22, at 163–64 (discussing this stan-
dard of review).
25 See generally Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271 (2008)
(arguing that Chevron rests on the confluence of various rationales for deference).
2013] hierarchically  variable  deference 737
which stated that the Chevron deference regime applied where Con-
gress contemplated that the agency would act with the force of law.26
Admittedly, congressional intent does not seem to provide much
support to a theory of hierarchically variable deference.  If one is look-
ing for a congressional statement that courts at different places in the
judicial pyramid should employ different deference regimes, one will
not find it, at least not stated in those terms.  (As we will see below,
however, one could read some of Congress’s jurisdictional choices to
indirectly express views supportive of hierarchically variable defer-
ence.)27  The Administrative Procedure Act does not create hierarchi-
cally divergent standards of review but instead refers generically to
“the reviewing court.”28  The organic statutes that empower agencies
give them rulemaking power over certain fields of law, not rulemaking
power vis-a`-vis certain courts only.
The facts just mentioned need not unduly trouble us, however,
for genuine congressional intent is probably not able to provide a sat-
isfying account of contemporary deference doctrines, especially at the
level of fine details.  The type of congressional intent that is supposed
to justify deference is typically an implicit or constructive intent.  Even
Mead recognized that the legislative delegation justifying Chevron def-
erence need not be express but can be imputed to Congress based on
the circumstances (in particular, the conferral on the agency of a gen-
eral power to administer the statute coupled with ambiguous lan-
guage in the operative provisions).29 Chevron itself was even more
candid about the limited role of intent, treating even inadvertent leg-
islative ambiguity as “delegation” and justifying deference by appeal-
ing to functional considerations like expertise and political
responsibility.30  (Notably, Chevron did not even cite the APA’s stan-
dards of review.)  Genuine and particularized congressional intent
plays even less of a role in the Skidmore regime, in which the agency’s
power to persuade depends on a balance of pragmatic considerations
such as the degree of administrative expertise involved, the agency’s
thoroughness, and the persistence of the agency’s view.31  Similarly
26 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 231 (2001); see also Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (referring
to “express” and “implicit” congressional delegations of authority to agencies).
27 See infra subsection II.A.2.
28 5 U.S.C. § 706.
29 533 U.S. at 229.
30 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865–66.
31 As the Court wrote in Skidmore:
There is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts should
pay to the Administrator’s conclusions. . . . The weight of [the Administra-
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instructive on the limited role of congressional intent in deference
doctrine is the Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that Chevron
(rather than the less deferential National Muffler standard) governs
judicial review of Treasury Regulations.32  Although the Court
referred generally to congressional intent and cited Mead, the Court
also relied on functional considerations like expertise and doctrinal
consistency.33
In short, to the extent that doctrines of judicial deference are
justified by legislative intent, that intent is a highly generalized and
implicit one.34  Yet imputing to Congress the intent to have courts
defer to agencies is defensible, for it is often sensible policy to defer.35
And it is sensible because of various institutional features of agencies,
such as the fact that agencies possess expertise, promote national uni-
formity, and are more politically responsive than courts.  Because of
those and other institutional advantages of agencies, it makes sense
that Congress would generally want agencies—and not courts—to
have the authority to elaborate the details of regulatory schemes.  The
upshot is that the intent-based rationale for deference, especially
when it comes to matters of detail, is mostly just parasitic on other,
more pragmatic rationales.  And if those rationales apply in a hierar-
chically variable way, then so too would the (imputed) intent ratio-
nale.  As the next several sections show, the most satisfying
tor’s] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi-
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944); see also supra text accompanying
notes 17–19 (discussing Skidmore deference).
32 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011).
33 Id. at 711–14.
34 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212 (“Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized statement
of legislative desire . . . .”); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (1986) (observing that explicit delegations of
interpretive authority are rare and that courts employ “a kind of legal fiction” when
they infer such intent); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (stating that any rule about legislative intent to dele-
gate interpretive authority “represents merely a fictional, presumed intent”).
35 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 34, at 212 (stating that “Chevron is a judicial
construction, reflecting implicit policy judgments about what interpretive practices
make for good government”); Breyer, supra note 34, at 370 (stating that courts
“look[ ] to practical features of the particular circumstance to decide whether it
‘makes sense’ . . . to imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the agency’s
interpretation”).
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justifications for judicial deference do in fact have a hierarchically
variable character.
2. Expertise
One of the leading justifications for judicial deference to admin-
istrative agencies has traditionally been that agencies have pertinent
expertise.  The Supreme Court observed in Chevron that the regula-
tory scheme at issue in that case was “technical and complex” and that
“[j]udges are not experts in the field.”36  Similarly, under the more
flexible Skidmore regime, the proper degree of judicial deference
depends in large part on how much agency expertise is on display in
the particular agency determination at hand.37
Agency expertise takes several forms.  Probably most obvious is
expertise of the technical sort: what level of benzene exposure poses a
health hazard, what vehicle safety devices are most effective, etc.38
Few would suppose that generalist judges—at any level of the hierar-
chy—are ideally situated to make such decisions.  Less obviously, but
more importantly for present purposes, agencies also have certain
advantages over courts even in terms of the “lawfinding” aspects of
statutory implementation.  Agencies typically have a deeper apprecia-
tion of how different interpretive choices affect a complex regulatory
scheme with many interrelated parts, understand more fully the origi-
nal intentions and compromises that generated the statute, and are
more cognizant of current political preferences, all of which might be
36 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).  Although agency expertise is often taken for granted, it is worth pointing out
that one cannot just assume that all agencies outperform generalist judges in all areas.
See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist
Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 82, 82 (2013) (arguing that the Federal Trade Commission “does not
perform as well as generalist judges in its adjudicatory antitrust decision-making
role”).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (observing that
some degree of deference was appropriate under Skidmore because of the agency’s
“specialized experience”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (refer-
ring to the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information” avail-
able to the agency); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268–69 (2006)
(concluding that the Attorney General’s regulation merited little deference under
Skidmore because the Attorney General lacked medical expertise).
38 To be sure, even seemingly “technical” questions implicate value judgments as
well.  To the extent that is so, agencies again have an advantage over courts, given
agencies’ greater democratic accountability. See infra subsection I.B.3.
740 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
useful interpretive inputs.39  The agency advantages derive in part
from differences in personnel—federal agencies employ office build-
ings full of specialists, courts do not—but they also reflect institutional
limitations of the judicial role.  Agencies can synthesize information
from many sources and take a comprehensive view, unlike a court that
is limited to the adversarial adjudication of a discrete case.40
The size of the agency advantage depends on which court is at
issue.  Generally speaking, the Supreme Court can approximate the
expertise of an agency more closely than can lower courts.  This is not
so much because the Justices themselves have special talents but
rather because they enjoy a more favorable decision-making environ-
ment than their colleagues below them.  It is an environment rich in
resources, both internal and external.  Internally, the Justices have
sizeable and highly competent staffs of law clerks and librarians.  Per-
haps more importantly, the Court’s relatively small docket provides
the luxury of time.  Regarding external resources, Supreme Court
advocacy is increasingly the preserve of highly competent specialists.41
These lawyers, whether in private firms, public interest organizations,
or the Solicitor General’s office, bring a high degree of effort and skill
to each case and leave few stones unturned.42  To the extent that any
important aspects of a case are neglected by the parties, amicus briefs
39 The scholarly literature has identified a wide variety of agency interpretive
advantages over courts.  E.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 11, at 170–71 (policy coherence);
Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027,
2126–29 (2002) (current political preferences); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at
1173, 1176 (statutory history and evolution); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institu-
tional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 93–106 (legisla-
tive purpose); Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 123, 124, 130–31 (background principles and policies specific to particular
fields of law); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibil-
ity to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
321, 321–22 (1990) (legislative history and purpose); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDG-
ING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 208–11, 212–15 (2006) (canvassing a number of differences
in the competencies of agencies and courts as interpreters); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 568–92 (1985) (same);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 504–24 (2005) (same).
40 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469, 485–87 (1986).
41 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491–1502 (2008)
(describing the recent rise of an elite, specialized Supreme Court bar).
42 The advocates’ efforts are not limited by the client’s willingness to pay.  Attor-
neys will discount their rates and perform uncompensated work with the goal of
enhancing their reputations and getting more work in the future. See id. at 1557.
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fill the gap.  Almost every Supreme Court case attracts them, often
many of them.43  Aside from conventional legal argument, these briefs
can offer useful interpretive inputs such as information on policy con-
text, interest group alignments, and relevant facts not contained in
the formal record.44  Even when the United States or one of its agen-
cies is not a party to the case, the government usually files high-quality
amicus curiae briefs that provide detailed information about the statu-
tory context.45
43 See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 47 fig.3.1 (2008)
(showing an increase in amicus curiae participation); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743, 754–56 (2000) (same).
44 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Infor-
mational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 215, 225–28 (Cor-
nell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (explaining that amicus briefs often
provide information about the preferences of the other branches and the public);
Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 SCI. 537, 538 (1998) (stat-
ing that amicus briefs can educate the Court on technical matters and improve deci-
sionmaking); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 21–37 (2011) (discussing the use of amicus briefs, espe-
cially in the Supreme Court, as sources of extra-record facts); cf. Rebecca Haw, Amicus
Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247,
1248–49 (2011) (observing that the Court’s amicus practice in antitrust cases resem-
bles administrative rulemaking, but arguing that creating an administrative agency
would be better).
45 In recent years, the Solicitor General has filed amicus briefs in about 75% of
the Supreme Court’s non-constitutional civil cases that arise from the lower federal
courts and in which the government is not already a party.  Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litiga-
tion, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1359 (2010).  A complication should be noted here.  Gov-
ernment briefs sometimes convey not just useful background information but also set
forth what purport to be authoritative interpretations that the relevant federal agency
has not previously announced through formal means, and the Supreme Court some-
times gives some deference to these newly announced interpretations. See Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 1, at 1112–13, 1143; Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General
Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court (Univ. of Cincinnati
Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-
08, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129768;
see also Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 997, 1034–47 (2007) (urging courts to solicit and give weight to agency amicus
briefs).  Assuming that it is proper to defer to views announced in this format at all,
the argument of this Article suggests that lower courts should defer to them more
heavily.  The complication arises because the interpretation seeking deference might
not have been formulated until the case reached the Supreme Court and the Solicitor
General announced it in the brief. See Bruhl, supra note 4, at 463–65 (discussing the
problem of newly announced administrative guidance).  Thus, while the lower court
should defer more where such interpretations are available, this particular form of
interpretation is less available in the lower courts.
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The decision-making environment is, on the whole, less favorable
the lower one goes down the judicial pyramid.  As one moves down,
the caseloads generally grow while the resources shrink.  Time is
short; administrative records, long.46  The quality and effort of the
advocates is uneven.47  Amicus briefs, which are ubiquitous at the
Supreme Court, are quite rare in the courts of appeals and extremely
rare in the district courts, thus depriving the courts of potentially use-
ful information and perspectives.48  District judges in particular lack
the deliberative and debiasing advantages that colleagues can pro-
vide.49  This is not to say that district courts lack any special competen-
cies,50 but it is to say that their expertise lies elsewhere than in
directing national regulatory policy.
To be sure, the relationship between relevant expertise and hier-
archical position is far from perfect.  Some lower courts have particu-
lar familiarity with certain subjects, whether as a result of specialized
jurisdiction or geographic accident: the D.C. Circuit in some aspects
of regulatory law and the Southern District of New York in securities
litigation, for example.  And some individual judges possess subject-
46 Stephen Breyer, then serving as a judge on the First Circuit, described the
predicament as follows:
How can [judges on the courts of appeals] analyze fully a record, for exam-
ple, reflecting 10,000 comments made in response to a notice of proposed
rulemaking?  Can judges, when faced with such complexity and detail, do
more than ask, somewhat superficially, whether the agency’s result is reason-
able?  Can they do more than catch the grosser errors?  Can they conduct
the thorough, probing, in-depth review that they promise?
Breyer, supra note 34, at 390 (footnote omitted).
47 See Interview with Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 145,
160 (2010) (assessing briefing in the Supreme Court as “pretty uniformly good” and
stating that “[y]ou’ll get very good briefs in the circuits on a lesser number of occa-
sions”).  It bears noting that the D.C. Circuit, with a somewhat specialized bar, may
differ in this respect. See infra subsection II.A.1.
48 A recent survey of judges asked them to estimate the percentage of cases with
amicus briefs.  In the federal courts of appeals, the vast majority of responding judges
said no more than five percent of cases had amicus briefs.  In the district courts, the
vast majority of responding judges said that amicus activity was minimal.  Linda Sand-
strom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of
Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 686–87 (2008).
49 See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Mak-
ing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (describing how collegial deliberation can pro-
duce better decisions).  Even if deliberation is nonexistent or not beneficial, the
likelihood of getting a correct answer should increase as the number of judges
increases, given certain plausible assumptions.  Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G.
Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 97–100 (1986).
50 See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (noting the
institutional advantage of trial courts over appellate courts in finding facts).
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matter expertise based on prior experience.  If subject-matter exper-
tise were the only consideration in fashioning standards of review, per-
haps the Supreme Court should be more deferential than some of its
supposed “inferiors” (though specialization and narrow expertise can
lead to their own types of decision-making deficits).51  But clearly
there are other considerations at stake besides perfectly tailoring judi-
cial doctrine to expertise or other rationales for deference, and we
will return to the matter of optimal variation later.52  Nonetheless,
with those caveats noted, one can say, as a general matter, that the
Supreme Court has relatively more expertise than the lower courts,
particularly the generalist lower courts, in ways relevant to reviewing
agency interpretations.  If that is right, then one prominent argument
for judicial deference has greater force as one moves down the judi-
cial pyramid.
3. Democratic Pedigree
Deference has also been justified on democratic grounds—
namely that agencies are politically accountable and courts are not.
Chevron put it this way:
In contrast [to courts], an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delega-
tion, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of
wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices . . . .  [F]ederal judges—who have no constitu-
ency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.53
This passage from Chevron locates agency accountability primarily
in agencies’ link to the President.  The President selects and can often
remove high-ranking agency officials and, increasingly, exercises cen-
51 For treatments of the issue of judicial review of agency action by specialized
courts, see, among others, David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of
Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62–85
(1975); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2011);
Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing
Agency Decision Making, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 55 (2013); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized
Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
52 See infra subsections II.B.2.b–c; see also infra subsection II.A.1 (discussing the
D.C. Circuit’s arguably special role).
53 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984).
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tralized control over regulatory initiatives.54  A more complete
account would note that agencies are also subject to supervision by
Congress—through oversight hearings, funding decisions, informal
contacts, and the possibility of legislation overriding agency action—
plus scrutiny from non-governmental groups and the media, whose
complaints can then trigger further presidential or congressional
action.55
The federal judiciary, by contrast, is designed not to be politically
accountable to either of the political branches, at least not in the most
direct ways.  The judges’ tenure in office and salary are exceedingly
secure.56  Impeaching judges based on their decisions is nearly
unthinkable.  Given the lack of political controls, and because federal
judges’ terms of service often stretch into the decades, the judges’
views can depart significantly from current executive or legislative
54 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (empowering the President to appoint
principal officers, with the Senate’s consent); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926) (upholding the President’s power to remove executive officials); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. (2012)
(providing for centralized review of regulatory action in the Office of Management
and Budget); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2272–2319 (2001) (summarizing the growth of presidentially directed administra-
tion).  The so-called independent agencies (such as the SEC and FCC) are less subject
to presidential control than executive agencies and departments. See, e.g.,
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–32 (1935) (allowing Congress to
limit the President’s power to remove heads of independent agencies); Memorandum
from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Indep. Regulatory Agencies, M-
11-28 (July 22, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2011/m11-28.pdf (providing non-binding guidance to indepen-
dent agencies requesting that they follow certain review procedures required of exec-
utive agencies).
55 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2012) (creating procedures for congressional dis-
approval of regulations); JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE (1990) (discuss-
ing oversight hearings and other mechanisms); Matthew D. McCubbins et al, Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) (explaining how agency structure facilitates legisla-
tive control). See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69–138 (2006) (describing various formal and informal methods of
congressional control); Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skid-
more Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2101–13 (2010) (describing how agencies face
accountability from a range of sources even when agencies act through informal
mechanisms).
56 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”).
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preferences.57  There is much less reason to suppose that indepen-
dent judicial judgment, as compared to agency decisions, will tend to
reflect prevailing political views.  According to Elhauge, the relatively
greater tendency of agency action to track political preferences pro-
vides the single best rationale for the Chevron doctrine.58
As with other rationales for deference, the force of the political
rationale depends to some degree on which court is at issue.  That
different courts have different democratic pedigrees is most obvious if
one compares federal judges to their state colleagues, many of whom
face the voters in some type of election.59  But even within the federal
judiciary, which is our focus here, not all courts stand on the same
footing, democratically speaking.  Although all Article III federal
judges are quite insulated from after-the-fact accountability, there are
nonetheless important hierarchical differences when one instead con-
siders democratic pedigrees from the ex ante point of view.  Judges at
different levels of the federal judiciary differ in the extent to which
they have been democratically authorized to make national policy.
More specifically, Supreme Court Justices have a stronger claim in
that regard than do judges lower down in the hierarchy.  This is not
necessarily a claim that the Supreme Court will in fact tend to issue
decisions that align more closely with public opinion (or congres-
sional preferences or whatever other aggregation one prefers).60  It is
instead a normative claim about what different judges are entitled to
do.
The difference in policymaking entitlements arises because
judges at different levels of the federal hierarchy are chosen through
57 See L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 77, 77–78 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson
eds., 1998); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067, 1076 (2001).
58 Elhauge, supra note 39, at 2126–59.  Needless to say, the correspondence is not
perfect.  Perhaps the agency is captured by a narrow but powerful interest group.
(Though, it is worth pointing out that the same group could also exert outsized influ-
ence in Congress or with the White House too; all of the actors’ preferences could be
shifted away from an idealized “public interest.”)  For a recent treatment of regulatory
capture, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss
eds., 2013).
59 See generally Bruhl & Leib, supra note 4 (discussing whether judicial elections
should influence methods of statutory interpretation).
60 The empirical question of how closely the Supreme Court’s decisions match
public sentiment (somehow construed) continues to generate debate. Compare BARRY
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (emphasizing the correspondence
between public sentiment and the Court’s rulings), with Richard H. Pildes, Is the
Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103 (expressing skepti-
cism about strong versions of the majoritarian view).
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what are in fact quite different processes.  The process for selecting
modern Supreme Court Justices is typically exhaustive and fully
nationalized.  The President makes selections based, in large part, on
nominees’ ability to satisfy the ideological requirements and other
demands of his political coalition and the nominees’ apparent inclina-
tion to sustain key aspects of his agenda.61  The Senate may withhold
consent unless the nominee’s ideology is at least minimally acceptable
to pivotal members.  It is understood on all sides that the Justices will
make momentous decisions of national scope that rest, in no small
part, on their views of wise policy.
The selection process is different for the lower courts, especially
if we look at the other end of the Article III hierarchy, the federal
district courts.  Although the day has passed when appointments to
the district courts reflected concerns no grander than patronage, the
demands of local constituencies and home-state officials (especially
Senators armed with blue-slip vetoes) still play a significant role.62
And district judges, unlike officials in some other national bureaucra-
cies, usually spend their entire tenure in one location.  These state
and regional ties may well give district judges greater sensitivity to, and
perceived legitimacy regarding, matters of particular concern in the
locality where they reside.63  But judicial review of federal administra-
tive action primarily implicates matters of national, not local, policy.
61 The political nature of the selection process for the Supreme Court is widely
acknowledged. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 3
(5th ed. 2008) (stating that ideological compatibility is usually the controlling factor
in Supreme Court nominations); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL
COURT 84–132 (1999) (documenting the political nature of the Supreme Court
appointments process and arguing that the Court is politically representative); Robert
A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957) (“Presidents are not famous for appointing justices hostile to
their own views on public policy nor could they expect to secure confirmation of a
man whose stance on key questions was flagrantly at odds with that of the dominant
majority in the Senate.”).  To be sure, not all of the factors bearing on the President’s
decision concern the nominee’s own policy views and broader ideology.  For Demo-
cratic Presidents in particular, demographic diversity is an important consideration.
62 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 13–14 (1997) (discussing
influences on the selection of judges); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS 1–46 (2005)
(elaborating on changes in the process for selecting lower-court judges).
63 Cf. Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial
Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 1013 (2010) (“[T]rial judges are generally
understood to be cognizant of, and often expected to be responsive to, local sensibili-
ties.”).  District judges’ local rooting can have a dark side. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004) (discussing the hostility of some Southern federal judges to school
desegregation).
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Regarding those matters, Senate scrutiny of district court nominees’
ideological predispositions remains less intense.64  This makes sense
given that there are many district judges and most of the cases they
hear lack political importance.  For nominees to the courts of appeals,
the process occupies an intermediate position between the process for
the Supreme Court and the process for the district court in the rele-
vant respects.65
In light of these differences in the selection process, Supreme
Court Justices have a stronger claim, as compared to lower-court
judges, to have been democratically authorized to make national pol-
icy.  Because policymaking discretion is frequently at issue when
judges review agency interpretations,66 such cases frequently have a
strongly political aspect.  Indeed, there is by now much evidence that
judges’ ideological predispositions, while not determinative, have sub-
stantial power in predicting votes in administrative cases.67  That may
64 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 57, at 1074 (“It is usually easier to appoint
strongly ideological lower court judges than Justices because there is less scrutiny by
the Senate.  Indeed, one interesting fact about both Robert Bork and Clarence
Thomas is that each had easily won confirmation to the Court of Appeals.”).  Again,
the process has changed over time, such that there is more scrutiny today than there
used to be.  Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower
Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 259, 276–78 (2002).  The point is just that the
level of scrutiny varies by court.
65 See GOLDMAN, supra note 62, at 13; Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments and
the Presidential Agenda, in THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 19, 22 (Paul Brace et
al. eds., 1989).  Appointments to the courts of appeals are sometimes highly conten-
tious, such as when the nominee is suspected of being a future candidate for the
Supreme Court.  D.C. Circuit appointments are frequently difficult. See infra subsec-
tion II.A.1 (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s arguably special role).
66 The Supreme Court itself acknowledges this, which shows it is not a particu-
larly radical realist insight. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,
696 (1991) (“[T]he resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a ques-
tion of policy than of law.”).
67 E.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169–71
(1998) (D.C. Circuit cases involving Chevron); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investi-
gation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Envi-
ronmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 793–95 (2008) (courts of appeals
environmental cases involving Chevron); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823
(2006) (Supreme Court cases involving Chevron and courts of appeals environmental
and labor cases involving Chevron); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chev-
ron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1784–91 (2010) (Supreme Court cases
involving agency interpretations); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideol-
ogy, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (environmental cases in the D.C.
Circuit); Mark J. Richards et al., Does Chevron Matter?, 28 L. & POL’Y 444, 461–62, 464
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be a problem from the point of view of judicial impartiality and (if
one wants to be dramatic about it) the Rule of Law, but it is a less
serious problem when the judges have at least been chosen—as our
Supreme Court Justices have—to be national policymakers.
There are, to be sure, some difficulties with treating the Justices
as democratically authorized policymakers.  Given that the Justices
hold lifetime appointments (and now tend to stay on the Court longer
than in the past), they will outlast the particular elected officials who
democratically blessed them.  The legal issues at the forefront of the
Court’s agenda change over time, such that a Justice who was selected
because of (say) his views on national power in the economic sphere
can end up, thirty years later, on a Court focused on criminal proce-
dure and racial justice.  When there has been a sustained transition
between political regimes (as opposed to a period of flux and rapid
alternations between the parties), a majority of incumbent Justices
may continue for some time to represent the views of the departed
regime that appointed them, not the preferences of the new regime.68
Of course, lower-court judges—who are also serving increasingly long
terms69—can do the same things.  And it is even more problematic for
them to do so, given the nature of their appointment process.  Fur-
ther, the relatively large membership of the Supreme Court will tend
to dilute the influence of ideological outliers and holdovers, in con-
trast to a district court where an outlier could be a majority of one.
Again, the crucial question is not how the Supreme Court compares
to the agencies in terms of democratic pedigree; what matters is the
difference across courts.
(2006) (Supreme Court administrative cases).  To be clear, the evidence on this point
is not unequivocal. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the
Administrative State: Lessons from A Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 45, 98–101 (2001) (finding that principled decisionmaking best explains a
decade of D.C. Circuit environmental cases); cf. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chev-
ron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 48–52, 59 (1998) (reporting that political factors had only “mixed success” in
predicting outcomes in the courts of appeals, though they were better predictors than
several other factors).
68 See sources cited supra note 57.  Indeed, the old Justices might actively resist
the new regime’s initiatives, in a sort of rear-guard defense of the old order. Cf.
Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and
Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 488 (2002) (“When a rising political movement
sharply questions established legal principles, the Supreme Court often defends the
old order by launching a preemptive strike to defeat the constitutional insurgents
. . . .”).
69 See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and
Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 617–19 (2005) (charting the increasing average
length of tenure).
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4. Nationally Uniform Regulatory Policy
Still another rationale for deference—and the rationale that has
the strongest hierarchical slant of all—is the argument from national
uniformity.  This argument, which is probably most closely identified
with Peter Strauss,70 begins with the premise that there are good rea-
sons to want federal law to be uniform throughout the country and
then adds the observation that the Supreme Court’s limited docket
renders it unable to ensure such uniformity.  Congressional creation
of an administrative agency with rulemaking powers can help achieve
nationwide uniformity, of course, but the agency might fail in its task
if lower courts across the land review the agency’s interpretations de
novo, thus substituting their own (predictably disuniform) preferred
readings.  If, by contrast, courts are required to defer to the agency’s
single nationwide interpretation, then uniformity can be achieved
without (as much) Supreme Court appellate intervention.  A doctrine
of deference therefore secures national uniformity where Supreme
Court review cannot.71
When one thinks carefully about this rationale for deference, it
turns out that the rationale justifies deference only by lower courts.
They, after all, are the potential source of the disuniformity problem.
The Supreme Court, like the administrative agency, has a nationwide
jurisdiction, so whatever interpretation it chooses will be nationally
uniform.  Uniformity, therefore, does not provide a reason for the
Supreme Court itself to defer.72
5. Flexibility and Statutory Updating
Statutes tend to be long-lived, and a statute that works well when
enacted risks becoming ill-fitting or counterproductive as the years go
by.  Congress certainly has the authority to update legislation in light
70 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1105, 1121–22 (1987).
71 One can certainly question whether any particular matter needs to be gov-
erned by nationally uniform law or, more broadly, whether uniformity is as compel-
ling a judicial systemic value as it is often made out to be. See generally Amanda Frost,
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008) (critically assessing arguments for
uniformity).  But few would deny (and Frost does not deny) that some things ought to
be nationally uniform.  Given that objective, deference to a national administrative
agency is a sensible way to attain it.
72 Other scholars have noted this point as well. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 11, at 223
(observing that the uniformity advantage stemming from Chevron is inapplicable to
the Supreme Court itself); Elhauge, supra note 39, at 2134 (“[U]niformity [does not]
explain why the U.S. Supreme Court itself defers to agency interpretations . . . .”).
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of changes in the social and legal landscape.  But given that Congress
often does not do so, the question then becomes which other institu-
tion—courts or agencies—will take primary responsibility for updat-
ing.  Many commentators have thought that agencies are better suited
for guiding statutory evolution over time.73  The agencies’ compara-
tive advantage in this regard provides another rationale for judicial
deference to agency interpretations, including new and shifting
interpretations.
The agencies’ advantage in updating derives in part from their
expertise and accountability, both of which were discussed above, but
another important factor is cross-institutional variation in norms of
consistency.74  Within the judiciary, lower courts are absolutely bound
by the prior decisions of higher courts,75 and although the doctrine of
stare decisis does not absolutely forbid a court from overruling its own
precedents, a court will not overrule itself without a strong justifica-
tion.76  Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis is supposed to have “special
force” when it comes to prior decisions interpreting statutes.77  Thus,
whatever their other virtues, institutions governed by norms of stare
decisis are not well suited to adapting to changing circumstances.
The norm of stare decisis does not govern agencies, at least not in
the strong way it governs courts.  Subject to the usual duties to follow
73 E.g., Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art. 2 (2002); Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory
Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1058–63 (1998).
74 Cf. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295–96 (1996) (contrasting agencies
and courts with respect to stare decisis).
75 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[A] precedent of this Court must
be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.”).
76 See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201–02 (2006) (statement of
Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (stating that
stare decisis controls even when the Justice thinks the case was wrongly decided); Vas-
quez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (“[E]very successful proponent of overruling
precedent has borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in soci-
ety or in the law dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater
objective.”).  In the federal courts of appeals, the special justification required for
overruling circuit precedent is implemented not just through doctrinal formulations
but through institutional mechanisms, such as requiring formal or informal en banc
proceedings in order to overrule. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts
of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 794–800 (2012) (discussing circuit court practices
of stare decisis).  District court decisions lack binding force even in the rendering
court, though courts have occasionally made statements suggesting the contrary. Id.
at 789, 800–04.
77 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
2013] hierarchically  variable  deference 751
certain procedures and reach a reasonable position (non-trivial
requirements, to be sure), agencies are allowed to change their legal
interpretations and enforcement priorities.78  “[C]hange is not invali-
dating,” the Supreme Court has said, “since the whole point of Chev-
ron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute
with the implementing agency.”79  Further, in recognition of the need
to prevent regulatory policy from becoming frozen in place after ini-
tial encounters with the judiciary, the Supreme Court has held that
agencies can effectively displace prior judicial statutory decisions, so
long as the prior decision did not purport to discern the statute’s
unique meaning.  As the Court explained in the Brand X case, “Only a
judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses
the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”80
As with other rationales for deference, considerations surround-
ing statutory updating apply differently to different courts.  If all fed-
eral courts throughout the hierarchy construed statutes
authoritatively, agency flexibility would be seriously and quickly cur-
tailed.81  Absent congressional action or judicial overruling—both of
which are difficult82—initial judicial interpretations would remain in
force despite changes in the broader legal landscape or new notions
78 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16 (2009) (con-
cluding that an agency’s shift in enforcement policy did not violate the Administrative
Procedure Act’s “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard of review). Chevron itself
involved a change in the agency’s position. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857–58, 863–64 (1984).
79 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).  This is not to say that
agency inconsistency is irrelevant.  Inconsistency explicitly counts against the persua-
siveness of the agency’s position according to the less deferential regime of Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (referring to the value of “consistency with
earlier and later [agency] pronouncements”), and inconsistency reduces the agency’s
actual prospects for judicial validation even when Chevron applies. See Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 1, at 1148–51. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding
Agency Interpretations 7–8 (St. John’s Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 13-0002, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2224066 (arguing that longstanding agency interpretations merit heightened
judicial deference).
80 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982–83 (2005).
81 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Adminis-
trative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1275–76, 1302–06 (2002).
82 It is true that district court decisions typically lack binding precedential effect,
and in that sense district courts could be dynamic updaters.  But even when adminis-
trative cases begin in the district court (which many do not, see infra subsection
II.A.2), the legal issues in major administrative cases are particularly likely to be
appealed to the courts of appeals, where stare decisis does apply.
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of wise policy.  Agencies could respond with an aggressive practice of
non-acquiescence,83 but this raises its own difficulties and would pro-
vide only a partial solution.  The ossification problem would not be
nearly as serious if only Supreme Court interpretations authoritatively
fixed statutory meaning.  The Court’s decisions are few and often very
slow in coming, so agencies would not be so hemmed in by prece-
dents.  The interpretations the Court did issue might be few enough
and salient enough that Congress could fit them on its agenda for
possible legislative override—or at least this is much more plausible
than it would be for lower-court decisions.  Without going so far as to
conclude that Brand X and associated doctrines should not apply to
the Supreme Court at all,84 one can at least say that the argument for
allowing agencies to trump courts applies more forcefully in the lower
courts.
6. Application to Judicial Review of Other Agency Activities
Agencies engage in many different activities, of which issuing
legal interpretations is just one.  They also make, among other things,
factual determinations and various sorts of discretionary policy judg-
ments.  The theoretical case for hierarchically variable deference
applies, in its essentials, to these activities too.
Consider first the matter of agency policymaking discretion,
which is typically reviewed under the catchall “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard.85  To some extent, an agency’s exercise of discretion
shades into statutory interpretation, for an agency’s discretion is con-
strained by the statutory background.  Thus, an agency’s exercise of
discretion can be set aside if (among other things) it relies on factors
that the statute forbids or lacks a reasonable relationship to the statu-
tory objectives.86  To the extent that discretion is an exercise in statu-
83 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (describing and evaluating the practice
of nonacquiescence by administrative agencies).
84 Cf. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Court’s reasoning would not necessarily apply in a case in which the prior judicial
precedent came from the Supreme Court rather than from a lower court); Jennifer J.
McGruther, Note, Chevron vs. Stare Decisis: Should Circuit Courts Follow Judicial Precedent
or Defer to Agencies as Mandated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
611, 629–30 (2003) (arguing for treating Supreme Court and lower court precedents
differently, in a pre-Brand X analysis).  I return to issues surrounding the Brand X
doctrine in infra subsection II.B.2.a.
85 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Bressman, supra note 22, at 177.
86 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); Bressman, supra note 22, at 181–83.
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tory interpretation, the arguments adduced above show that lower
courts should be especially solicitous of the agency’s understanding of
its statute.  At the same time, to the extent that the exercise of agency
discretion is instead just a matter of policy choice, no court has much
warrant to set it aside, but higher courts at least have somewhat
greater policymaking competence on both technical and democratic
grounds.
Judicial review of agency factual determinations is, at least at first
glance, harder to fit into an account requiring greater deference in
lower courts.  Indeed, if there were to be any hierarchical variation, it
might seem that lower courts—trial courts in particular—should be
less deferential than higher courts in this domain.  That view seems to
follow from trial courts’ comparative institutional advantage over
appellate courts in dealing with facts.  But that thinking moves too
fast.  It is true that trial courts have an institutional advantage in fact-
finding.87  But fact-finding is not actually at issue here; review of fact-
finding is.88  With rare exceptions, review of agency factual determina-
tions does not involve hearing witnesses or taking fresh evidence,
which are the kinds of activities for which trial courts are better situ-
ated than appellate courts.89  Rather, what is usually involved is the
appellate activity of reviewing a cold record to determine if a previous
decision maker’s findings are sustainable in light of the record that
decision maker compiled.90  Moreover, the kinds of factual disputes at
issue in administrative cases are frequently not simple historical
facts—e.g., was the stoplight red?—but instead concern complicated
technical or predictive judgments embodied in documentary evi-
dence.  Thus, when it comes to reviewing agency factual determina-
87 See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (referring to the
“superiority of the district court’s factfinding ability”); Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion
About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 759 (1982) (“The most notable exception to full
appellate review is deference to the trial court’s determination of the facts.  The trial
court’s direct contact with the witnesses places it in a superior position to perform this
task.”).
88 See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“Generally speaking, district courts reviewing agency action under the APA’s arbi-
trary and capricious standard do not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as
appellate courts resolving legal questions.”).
89 See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 444–66 (2004) (emphasizing the limited range of
factual issues regarding which trial courts have institutional advantages).
90 That is, judicial review of agency action typically occurs in the context of a
closed record compiled by the agency. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 743–44 (1985); IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 F.3d 618, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 2
PIERCE, supra note 11, § 11.6, at 1047 (discussing the record rule).
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tions on an administrative record, we should expect competence to
increase as one moves higher in a judicial system because trial courts’
core competencies are not implicated and because appellate courts
have the benefit of more internal and external resources, time, and
deliberation.
Despite the somewhat greater competence of higher courts when
it comes to reviewing agency factual findings, there is a countervailing
systemic consideration that cuts against frequently conducting review
of factual findings in a high court like the Supreme Court.  Factual
findings, or at least most of them, are just less important in the grand
scheme of things.  The question whether, as a matter of historical fact,
a certain person dumped pesticides into a river is important to the
people involved but not very important from the point of view of the
legal system as a whole.  It is not the sort of question to which one
would expect or desire the Supreme Court to devote much effort.91
Of course, it is occasionally true that factual or quasi-factual determi-
nations have broad importance—such as with the question whether
greenhouse gas emissions endanger public health through their cli-
mate-changing effects.92  The best way to deal with the tension
between the greater competence of a high court to review factual
determinations and the typically low systemic value of having high
courts conduct such review is not to attempt to calibrate the standards
of review to the importance of the decision, however.  Rather, the bet-
ter approach works through the mechanism of case selection.  That is,
the Supreme Court would not and should not take many cases involv-
ing merely factual disputes93—though in the rare instances it does, it
could properly exhibit less deference to the agency than could a lower
court.
91 Cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a prop-
erly stated rule of law.”).
92 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); see
also Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(upholding the EPA’s endangerment finding).
93 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490–91 (1951) (“Our
power to review the correctness of application of the [substantial evidence] standard
ought seldom to be called into action. . . . This Court will intervene only in what
ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misappre-
hended or grossly misapplied.”).
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C. Some Initial Objections to Heterogeneity
The discussion so far has shown that the various rationales for
judicial deference apply differently to different courts.  There are a
number of steps that one has to take to get from that insight to a
prescription about what to do.  The strongest objections to a regime
of hierarchically variable deference are likely to involve the practicali-
ties and the consequences of implementation.  Implementation is dis-
cussed below, and pertinent objections and countervailing values (like
workability and simplicity) are considered there.94  Nonetheless, the
theoretical case for variable deference should acknowledge some
more abstract jurisprudential objections here.
The first such objection can take a few forms, and it can derive
from quite disparate jurisprudential foundations (or, for many peo-
ple, deep intuitions about the essential sameness of all judicial
power), but the basic idea is that there is a single right answer regard-
ing the proper level of deference.  This objection does not focus on
the contents of any particular regime of heterogeneous interpretation
but rather assails the idea of heterogeneity per se.
This sort of objection would have quite a bit of appeal if doctrines
of deference were primarily derived from, say, the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.  That statute, as noted, does not distinguish between
courts when it sets forth its standards of review.95  But our doctrines of
deference do not primarily spring from the APA or like sources. Chev-
ron did not even cite the APA standards.96 Skidmore could not cite the
APA, because Skidmore predated the statute by a few years.97  Rather,
the law in this area is (for better or worse) largely judicially crafted,
reflecting judicial assessments of policy and prudence.98
94 See infra Section II.B.
95 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
96 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944).
98 Supra subsection I.B.1.  Commentators disagree over whether this is a good or
a bad thing. Compare Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common
Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1293–94 (2012) (describing the common law
nature of administrative law as generally legitimate and anyway inevitable), with Rob-
ert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 34 (1996) (sharply criticizing the Supreme Court for neglecting
the APA), and John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 114–20, 189–99 (1998) (decrying the fact that standards of review have
departed so far from the text of the APA and lauding some tentative signs of greater
adherence to the text).
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To be clear, it is not the mere fact that doctrines of deference are
judicially created that defeats the single-right-answer objection to het-
erogeneity.  After all, much law is judge-made, and yet we generally
think that the common law announced by a high court is the law for
the courts below it too.  (A supreme court would not tell lower courts
to apply contributory negligence while it applies comparative negli-
gence, for instance.)  The key feature of the judicially crafted law of
deference that sets it apart from most other judge-made law (of con-
tracts, torts, or whatever subject) is that the considerations informing
the creation of the law of deference are essentially and distinctively
judicial-institutional in nature.  If the factors shaping standards of def-
erence are rooted in the institutional characteristics of courts (espe-
cially as compared to agencies), then it is altogether sensible that the
doctrine could vary as courts themselves vary.
Indeed, heterogeneity in standards of deference is not outland-
ish.  Outside of the context of review of agency action, there are
already instances in which standards of judicial scrutiny self-con-
sciously vary as one moves up the judicial hierarchy.  To pick an exam-
ple hiding in plain sight, consider the doctrine of precedent.  The
Supreme Court’s holdings are conclusive in lower courts.99  In the
Supreme Court itself, by contrast, its precedents receive a measure of
deference but are not absolutely binding.100  The binding law from
the point of view of a lower court can thus differ from the law as
viewed and applied by the Supreme Court—and thus the Supreme
Court can reverse even when the lower court did not err.  Perhaps
something similar can be true of the judiciary’s treatment of agency
“precedents”: great deference in lower courts but just some degree of
respect from the Supreme Court.  Consider as well an example from
federal habeas corpus: all federal courts apply the same deferential
standard in reviewing state convictions, but the Supreme Court is the
sole creator of the definitive federal law that can invalidate a
conviction.101
99 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
100 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexo-
rable command . . . .”); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 618–19
(1988) (listing instances in which the Court overruled previous decisions).  Similarly,
the Supreme Court gives its summary dispositions little precedential value, but they
are nonetheless binding on the lower courts. See Colo. Springs Amusements, Ltd. v.
Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
101 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (stating that a state decision
can be overturned on habeas only if it is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” (emphasis added)).
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A second objection to hierarchical variation would charge that it
causes unequal treatment across litigants and cases, and, worse, that it
does so intentionally.  But this objection is not sound for a few rea-
sons.  Norms of equal treatment apply to litigants who are similarly
situated, and they demand that like cases be treated alike.  Under a
regime of variable deference, no litigant would be marked with an
unfavorable standard of review wherever he moves through the judi-
cial system.  It is true that different standards would apply to litigants
at different levels of the system, but the bare claim of inequality begs
the question whether cases at different places in the system are in fact
alike.  The argument of this Article is that the cases are not relevantly
alike, given differences in the institutional contexts and roles of differ-
ent courts.  Further, similar forms of unequal treatment are pervasive
in the judicial system, including by design.  The same conduct may be
innocent under the law of one state but tortious or criminal under the
law of another state; a litigant may lose because a lower court is bound
by precedent that a high court would overrule if it considered the
matter.  Finally, it is worth observing that the introduction of hierar-
chical variation in standards of review could—depending on how it is
implemented—actually reduce arbitrary disparities in substantive law,
such as by reducing circuit splits on matters of federal law.102  In other
words, hierarchical heterogeneity could promote geographic equality.
None of the above is to say that there are no limits on the varia-
tions that a regime of deference could contain.  Certain cross-court
variations in deference could threaten the practical workability of the
appellate system.  Moreover, setting aside objections to heterogeneity
per se, any particular regime of hierarchically variable deference
would be objectionable if it called upon certain courts to employ a
standard of deference that was itself objectionable.  For example,
extreme deference by lower courts could threaten due process and
Article III values or stretch the language of the APA past the breaking
point.  But whether a system of hierarchically variable deference is vul-
nerable to all of these objections depends on what exactly the system
looks like.  It is therefore time to consider how, if at all, to implement
hierarchically variable deference.
II. POSSIBILITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
If the case for hierarchically variable deference is appealing in
principle, could our judicial system implement it in practice?  This
Part presents some structural and doctrinal possibilities for realizing a
102 See infra subsection II.B.2.
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hierarchically variable regime.  First, however, it describes some ways
in which our judicial system manifests hierarchical variation even now.
The analysis of this Article helps to explain and justify these existing
patterns of variation.
A. Ways in Which Our System Already Displays
Hierarchically Variable Deference
1. Unofficial Doctrinal Divergences?
As stated at the outset, official doctrines of deference do not
openly embrace hierarchical heterogeneity.103  Nonetheless, stan-
dards of review may be hierarchically variable in practice.  Specifically,
the Supreme Court may already give agencies less deference than the
lower courts typically do.  Admittedly, it is hard to be sure: despite the
significant and still growing body of empirical literature on defer-
ence,104 the existing research does not allow firm conclusions about
differences across courts.  Simply comparing agency win rates in dif-
ferent courts will not suffice.  For one thing, the Supreme Court’s
docket is small and highly unrepresentative, reflecting the strategic
choices of litigants to seek certiorari and the Justices to grant it.
Moreover, it is hard to calculate true levels of deference in any court,
for courts might cite a deference regime (or mention facts that would
trigger deference) because they plan to defer, rather than the other
way around.  (Thus, a 100% agency win rate in cases citing Chevron
would not necessarily reveal great deference if Chevron went ignored
in similar cases that the agency lost.)  Nonetheless, despite these com-
plications, there is at least some reason to believe that the Supreme
Court is not as deferential as a faithful application of current doctrine
would direct.  Eskridge and Baer present evidence that the Court does
not invoke any deference regime in the majority of cases that involve
agency interpretations; this frequently happens even in cases that are,
according to prevailing doctrine, Chevron-eligible.105  The failure to
invoke a deference regime is, in turn, associated with lower agency
win rates.106  Further empirical analysis by Raso and Eskridge leads
them to the conclusion that the Justices invoke deference regimes epi-
sodically and inconsistently, which is not what one would expect if the
103 Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
104 For a recent summary of the research, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the
Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011); see also
sources cited supra note 67 (citing various empirical analyses of judicial decision-mak-
ing in agency cases).
105 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1090, 1120–21, 1124–25.
106 Id. at 1142–44.
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Court regarded deference regimes as having true stare decisis effect.107
By way of contrast, there is at least some evidence that the Supreme
Court’s deference doctrines do have a substantial effect in the lower
courts, though to be sure the findings are hardly definitive.108
107 Raso & Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1733–34, 1817.  Richards and his co-authors
report that the Court is less likely to defer in rulemaking cases than in non-rulemak-
ing cases, which suggests to them that Chevron exerts less influence when the stakes
are high.  Richards et al., supra note 67, at 456.
108 See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238, 1271, 1280 (2007) (finding that “most
judges [on the courts of appeals] perceive Skidmore as an actual restraint” and that
“Skidmore review is highly deferential”); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984,
1029–42, 1057–59 (finding that lower courts other than the D.C. Circuit significantly
increased the rate at which they affirmed agencies in the wake of Chevron, though the
effect dissipated somewhat in 1988, the last period in their dataset); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Inco-
herence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 749 (1995) (reporting his
impression that “[t]he Chevron test has largely realized its potential at the circuit court
level”); cf. Revesz, supra note 67, at 1729–30, 1747–50, 1767 (finding that ideological
effects in the D.C. Circuit were much less pronounced in statutory interpretation
cases governed by Chevron than in process-based challenges to agency action, and
attributing the difference to the greater risk of Supreme Court review in the former
context compared to the latter).  Although Miles and Sunstein found that overall
agency validation rates in the courts of appeals were similar to the rates in the
Supreme Court, Miles & Sunstein, supra note 67, at 849, that does not mean that the
two kinds of courts are similarly deferential, and Miles and Sunstein do not make such
a claim.  Their dataset for the courts of appeals (but not the Supreme Court) was
limited to two subject areas that were expected to be especially ideologically conten-
tious, which probably reduced the level of deference the courts of appeals displayed.
See id. at 843, 848.
As noted, the evidence on whether deference doctrines actually affect judicial
decisions is complex and not wholly conclusive.  Because Chevron is regarded as such a
landmark precedent, it presents an attractive target for an event study that compares
outcomes in lower courts immediately before and after, which was the approach taken
in Schuck & Elliott, supra.  But this strategy is complicated by the fact that what we
now know as the Chevron doctrine did not immediately take shape but rather devel-
oped gradually in fits and starts, in substantial part through the work of lower courts.
See generally Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins
of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (tracing the early history of
the Chevron doctrine).  Yet if one looks over a longer time horizon, one confronts
more confounding variables (such as changes in the composition of the judiciary)
and the possibility of dynamic effects of Chevron itself.  Regarding the latter possibility,
a steady affirmance rate over time is consistent with increasing judicial deference if
agencies become more aggressive in their interpretive positions in response to Chev-
ron. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the
Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3,
11–12 (2005) (suggesting that agencies did just that).
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Eskridge and Baer float the possibility that the Court regards defer-
ence regimes as guides for lower courts but does not regard them as
binding or necessary in the Court itself.109
Even in the absence of definitive statistical evidence, there are
some circumstantial and structural reasons to suspect that the
Supreme Court is less deferential than lower courts.  First, because the
Supreme Court has no reviewing court above it, it need not fear rever-
sal for ignoring or misapplying deference regimes in order to reach
particular favored outcomes.  Second, the Justices might feel (with
some justification) that their relatively favorable decision-making envi-
ronment—their advantages in resources, time, perceived expertise,
and so forth110—makes deference less necessary for them than for
their more “limited” colleagues in the lower courts.  Third, it is easier
to write an opinion affirming an agency than an opinion reversing it,
and so one imagines that deference is an especially appealing path of
least resistance for a busy lower court that lacks the luxury of a discre-
tionary docket.111
If it is true that the Court flouts its own deference doctrines, one
response is to lament the Court’s disobedience.  Yet the analysis of this
Article suggests another possibility: that the Court’s vice is actually a
virtue, because deference is not as appropriate for the Supreme
Court.  That is, this Article can help reconcile us to a feature of
existing practice that might otherwise trouble us.  And were the Court
candidly to announce that it follows different rules, that might reduce
the extent to which the Court’s non-deferential decisions in adminis-
trative cases can mislead the lower courts about how the lower courts
should behave.
Similar comments could be made about the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  There is evidence that
the D.C. Circuit tends to be less deferential than other courts of
appeals.112  Perhaps that court’s posture reflects overconfidence or
109 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1119–20; see also Laurence H. Silberman,
Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824–25 (1990)
(stating that, from his position as an appellate judge, he “would not be surprised” if
the Supreme Court showed itself “less willing to apply Chevron deference rigorously to
itself if it is uncomfortable with a policy result on an issue of particular interest”).
110 See supra subsections I.B.2–5 (describing these advantages).
111 See Pierce, supra note 104, at 90–93; see also Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115, 1130 (2011) (finding evidence that courts of appeals
deferred to district courts more when caseloads increased).
112 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 794–802 (2008); Pierce, supra note 104, at 90–93.
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undue activism,113 but there may be something to say for a relatively
assertive stance when one considers the justifications for judicial def-
erence.  The D.C. Circuit’s semi-specialized docket and lower
caseload114 arguably confer expertise and technical competence in
comparison to the regional circuits.  The politicized and nationalized
nature of the selection process for the D.C. Circuit approximates the
process for the Supreme Court, to which the D.C. Circuit is often
regarded as a stepping stone.115  When the D.C. Circuit is the exclu-
sive venue for a certain kind of case, as it sometimes is,116 there are no
problems of uniformity.  To the extent the D.C. Circuit is a “junior
varsity” Supreme Court in terms of its institutional context and com-
petencies,117 reduced deference vis-a`-vis other lower courts is defensi-
ble.  (One could generalize these points beyond the context of
administrative review, of course, by considering other (semi-)special-
ized or expert courts like bankruptcy courts and the Federal
Circuit.)118
113 Cf. Revesz, supra note 67, at 1771 (suggesting the possibility of reducing the
D.C. Circuit’s role in administrative review).
114 See Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 10–13), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2238049 (noting these features of the D.C.
Circuit).
115 See, e.g., The District of Columbia Circuit: The Importance of Balance on the Nation’s
Second Highest Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1–4 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement of
Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman of the Subcommittee) (noting that many
Supreme Court Justices have formerly served on the D.C. Circuit and that many cases
of national import are considered by the D.C. Circuit, including administrative
agency review cases, which Congress sometimes mandates must be heard by the D.C.
Circuit).
116 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (various EPA actions under
the Clean Air Act); 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (certain FCC actions);
see Fraser et al., supra note 114, at 19.
117 See Hearing, supra note 115, at 1–4.
118 Cf. Ted L. Field, Hyperactive Judges: An Empirical Study of Judge-Dependent “Judicial
Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit, 38 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
66–71), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245093 (finding that Federal Circuit
judges with prior patent law experience are more “judicially hyperactive” in patent
cases than judges without such prior experience); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I.
Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appel-
late Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1784–86, 1804 (2008) (finding that courts of
appeals affirm bankruptcy appellate panels at higher rates than they affirm district
courts in bankruptcy cases); see also supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing variations in judicial expertise).
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2. Current Patterns of Jurisdictional Allocation
A second way in which our system already displays hierarchical
variation comes in the form of congressional decisions about allocat-
ing jurisdiction.  The law governing jurisdiction to review agency
action is complex.119  It could hardly be otherwise, given that adminis-
trative action is itself ubiquitous and multifarious.  The pertinent fea-
ture of the jurisdictional pattern for present purposes is that Congress
has arranged the jurisdictional statutes so that many cases reviewing
agency action bypass the district courts and begin in the courts of
appeals.120  The usual explanation for this arrangement is that pro-
ceedings to review agency action have an appellate character.121  A
court typically reviews agency action based on the record compiled by
the agency, much as an appellate court reviews the findings and con-
clusions of a trial court.122  The distinctive capacity of trial courts to
take evidence and adjudicate facts is unneeded in most administrative
cases, and so beginning there merely causes duplication and delay.123
This Article illuminates an additional set of justifications for Con-
gress’s frequent (though not universal) decision to bypass the district
courts.  To begin, it is not just that review of agency action often has
an appellate character but, as explained above, it also often has a polit-
ical character; to that extent, district judges have less business setting
aside the choices of national administrators.124  In addition, cases
reviewing agency interpretations are legally and technically complex
in ways that may tax the resources of busy trial judges.125  Further, the
sheer numerosity and heterogeneity of district courts threatens a par-
ticularly problematic form of geographic disuniformity.126  These fac-
tors weigh in favor of strong deference, and so the value of having
119 For a summary, see generally 2 PIERCE, supra note 11, chs. 11, 15 (discussing
various procedural aspects of judicial review of adjudications and rulemaking pro-
ceedings); 3 id. chs. 16, 18 (discussing judicial standing and remedies).
120 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)-(b) (2006) (certain orders and rules of the SEC); 28
U.S.C. § 2342 (2006) (certain orders of the FCC and several other agencies); 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (various EPA actions under the Clean Air Act).
121 See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744–45 (1985); STE-
PHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 794–95 (7th ed.
2011); 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 71-72 (3d ed.
2010); Currie & Goodman, supra note 51, at 5–6.
122 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
123 See Fla. Power & Light, 470 U.S. at 744–45; 3 KOCH, supra note 121, at 71–73.
124 See supra subsection I.B.3.
125 See supra subsection I.B.2.
126 See supra subsection I.B.4.
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judicial review begin in those courts decreases.  Thus, Congress is
right to bypass the district courts in many administrative cases.127
B. Potential Changes to Current Law
One could stop there, treating hierarchical heterogeneity as a
theory that helps to justify and to explain certain aspects of current
practice.  But we can also ask whether it would be desirable to change
the law in a (more) hierarchically variable direction, and if so, how?
Translating the theoretical case for variable deference into a con-
crete implementation plan involves several complexities.  For one,
some variables are continuous (e.g., how much weight to give an
agency interpretation), while others are lumpy or dichotomous (e.g.,
which deference regime applies or whether a court has jurisdiction).
In the latter situation, one cannot make adjustments with perfectly
calibrated smoothness; instead, one has to decide whether the case for
variable deference is strong enough to take a certain step or not.  And
because each court is part of a larger system, one cannot necessarily
assume that changes at the court level will have corresponding, easily
predictable effects at the system level.
In addition, the decision to embrace hierarchical variation does
not by itself specify the ideal end state of the system and how it should
differ from the status quo.  If one begins with a baseline in which all
courts display basically the same level of deference (which, as just dis-
cussed, might not actually describe the current reality), one could
implement hierarchical variation from either end: by getting lower
courts to defer more or instead by having higher courts defer less or
indeed not at all.  The choice between those two approaches—ratch-
eting deference up in some places versus ratcheting it down in
others—implicates both normative and empirical questions.  On the
normative side, we would need to decide how much deference is
ideal.  Does judicial oversight usefully contribute to balanced govern-
ment and the formulation of rational policy?  Or does judicial review
hamper the regulatory system by inviting meddling from inexpert
generalists, or worse, agenda-driven partisans?  Both views have force-
ful advocates.128  On the empirical side, we would need to know how
127 I return to the topic of jurisdiction—and recommend further reforms—in
infra subsection II.B.1.a.
128 The literature is large.  For a sample of generally pro-agency perspectives, see 3
PIERCE, supra note 120, at 1568–82; VERMEULE, supra note 39, at 205–15; Frank B.
Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243
(1999); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossify-
ing” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).  For some views emphasizing the
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the levels of deference currently exhibited by various courts measure
up against the ideal level the normative analysis specifies.
Those are all very hard questions, indeed some of the most diffi-
cult in administrative law.  Certainly they cannot be resolved within
the scope of this Article.  (To state my own view for the sake of can-
dor: I believe that regulatory activity already faces serious non-judicial
checks—stalling by the Office of Management and Budget, de-fund-
ing by appropriations riders, intense lobbying and litigation threats by
regulated industries, and so on—such that the comparatively greater
risk comes from judicial review that is too tough rather than too leni-
ent.)  Recognizing that different readers will have different views on
whether it would be desirable to increase or instead to decrease the
overall amount of deference in the system (and if so, by how much),
the following subsections will provide a menu of options.  Some of the
options contemplate changes in governing doctrine, while others
operate on the structure of judicial system.  Most of them involve
increasing overall deference, though some of the mechanisms can be
used to achieve the opposite result.  And if judicial review already
tends to display hierarchically variable impulses whether we like it or
not, the mechanisms below could function as more transparent ways
to channel those existing tendencies.
1. Non-Doctrinal Approaches
Probably the most obvious way to implement hierarchically varia-
ble deference is just to change the formal doctrines such that they call
for varying degrees of deference in different courts.  But of course
each court is merely part of a system, and doctrinal variation can come
into conflict with other values, such as the need for workable appel-
late review.  As an illustration, imagine a judicial system with just two
courts, where the lower court applies a more deferential (i.e. agency-
friendly) standard than does the higher court.  When a party challeng-
ing an agency regulation loses in the lower court, that party has a
strong incentive to appeal to the higher court to get the benefit of its
less agency-friendly standard.  (In addition to the costs involved, there
may be distributional concerns lurking here too, as some litigants and
interests can afford multiple rounds of litigation better than others.)
value of judicial review, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2041, 2058–60 (2006); Farina, supra note 10, at 511–26; Jonathan T. Molot, Reex-
amining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judi-
cial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 COR-
NELL L. REV. 486 (2002).
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If the agency flunks the higher court’s tougher standard, then it seems
the higher court should reverse, even though the lower court may
have properly applied its (different, more agency-friendly) standard.
That does not seem like a good system of appellate review.  In such a
system, the proceedings in the lower court are not only unnecessary,
but also rather perverse.  Why bother with them?
That question—Why bother with the lower court?—is a very good
one.  And one answer is, Don’t bother.  That is, we could simply elimi-
nate review in the lower court.  The more general point is that one
can implement hierarchical variation not just doctrinally but jurisdic-
tionally.  To be clear, the difficulties confronting doctrinal implemen-
tation are not insuperable, and later we will explore some ways to
realize doctrinal variation.129  Nonetheless, structural fixes—altering
jurisdiction for one but also changing the timing of review, changing
voting rules, and the like—can avoid some of the difficulties that beset
doctrinal implementation.  Therefore, let us begin with some non-
doctrinal means of implementing hierarchical variation.  These non-
doctrinal measures can represent solutions in and of themselves, and
they can also work together with doctrinal solutions to make the latter
more workable.
a. Implementing Deference by Curtailing Jurisdiction
Agency interpretations come before the courts in a variety of set-
tings.  These include suits by interested parties challenging the facial
validity of new regulations in advance of any particular agency
enforcement of the regulations, suits in which the target of a particu-
lar enforcement action or agency adjudication contests the agency’s
determination that it has violated a statute as construed by the agency,
and private litigation that does not directly seek review of agency
action but in which agency interpretations of a governing statute may
affect the outcome of the suit.  Common examples of the last category
include, among many other things, employment discrimination cases
that implicate EEOC interpretations of antidiscrimination statutes130
and product liability suits that implicate whether a drug or device
manufacturer complied with FDA requirements.131  Given the fre-
129 See infra subsection II.B.2.
130 E.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 395, 397 (2008); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243–45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430–31
(1975).
131 E.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574–76 (2011); Riegel v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326–30 (2008).
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quency and variety of judicial encounters with agency interpretations,
it will be difficult to devise simple prescriptions for reform.
As a way to make some progress, let us set aside the ordinary pri-
vate litigation in which agency interpretations are relevant sources of
law and consider instead the problem of jurisdiction over suits that
seek review of agency action.  As noted already, under current law
many proceedings for review of agency action already skip the district
courts and begin directly in the courts of appeals.132  Not all of them
do, however, and there is often good reason to lodge jurisdiction ini-
tially in the district courts, such as when a particular administrative
scheme generates a vast number of low-stakes appeals that typically
turn on retail-level factual particularities rather than matters of
national policy.  Lawsuits challenging Social Security eligibility deter-
minations are an obvious example.133  Nonetheless, there are plenty
of instances in which current law allows suit in the district court even
when a case challenges the wholesale legal validity of a newly promul-
gated agency regulation or policy.134  Thus, the challenge to the
Obama Administration’s new rule on embryonic stem-cell research
was initially heard in a district court, which preliminarily enjoined the
rule before being reversed by the court of appeals.135  District courts
across the country are hearing many of the challenges to various regu-
lations implementing the Affordable Care Act.136  Similarly, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission’s recent “resource curse” regulation,
which requires companies in extractive industries to disclose pay-
ments to foreign governments, was reviewed in (and recently vacated
132 Supra subsection II.A.2.
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (vesting jurisdiction in the district courts); see
also 3 PIERCE, supra note 11, at 1681–82 (explaining that the jurisdictional decision is
sensible because the cases are numerous and fact-specific and the administrative
record is not necessarily closed to further development). See generally id. at 1680–98
(discussing the choice between district court and circuit court jurisdiction).
134 Even when no subject-specific statute vests jurisdiction in the district courts,
those courts have jurisdiction to review agency action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
the general federal-question jurisdiction statute.  Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977).  Review in the district court is therefore the default result unless Congress
affirmatively lodges jurisdiction directly in the court of appeals. See Watts v. SEC, 482
F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Dillard v. HUD, 548 F.2d 1142, 1143 (4th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam).
135 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 778–79 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (summarizing
the case’s procedural history).
136 E.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2013 WL 4052610
at *2 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2013) (reviewing the IRS rule on tax credits for participants
in insurance exchanges).
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by) a district court.137  District court review in these types of cases is
problematic.  As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, such pro-
ceedings typically have an appellate character and to that extent do
not take advantage of the district court’s special competency in factual
development; indeed, the district court proceedings seem positively
wasteful in light of the duplication of effort that will occur when the
district court’s decision is appealed (as it likely will be, given the
stakes).138
But that is not all.  The arguments adduced in this Article provide
additional grounds for criticism of district court jurisdiction.  As Part I
argued, the various considerations that support deference have partic-
ular force as one moves lower in the judicial system.  District courts
have lesser access to the resources, time, and information that would
facilitate sound regulatory review.  They have a weaker claim to have
been democratically authorized to make national policy.  And their
numerosity exposes the regulatory system to idiosyncrasy and con-
flict.139  True, a district court’s judgment need not be, and often will
137 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1668 (JDB), 2013 WL 3307114 (D.D.C. July
2, 2013).  For a sample of other recent or prominent examples, see Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–48 (1967) (allowing pre-enforcement review of FDA label-
ing regulation in district court); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 856 F.
Supp. 2d 778, 785–86 (D.S.C. 2012) (reviewing NLRB rule requiring employers to
post notices of employee rights), aff’d, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013); Koretoff v. Vil-
sack, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–5 (D.D.C. 2012) (reviewing USDA rule), aff’d, 707 F.3d 394
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627,
633 (E.D. La. 2010) (reviewing moratorium on offshore drilling following Deepwater
Horizon disaster); Emily’s List v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2005) (reviewing
FEC rule), aff’d, 170 F. App’x 719 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Defenders of the Wildlife v.
Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989) (reviewing Interior regulation pursuant to
the Endangered Species Act’s citizen suit provision), aff’d sub nom. Defenders of Wild-
life v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
138 As the Supreme Court has explained:
The factfinding capacity of the district court is . . . typically unnecessary to
judicial review of agency decisionmaking.  Placing initial review in the dis-
trict court does have the negative effect, however, of requiring duplication of
the identical task in the district court and in the court of appeals; both
courts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether
the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review.
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see also Am. Bioscience,
Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that a district
court reviewing agency action “sits as an appellate tribunal,” measuring the agency
record against the relevant legal standards); Currie & Goodman, supra note 51, at 17.
139 Cf. 2 PIERCE, supra note 11, at 1363–64 (noting the risks of vesting numerous
district judges with the power to enjoin agency rules).  The worry about a single dis-
trict judge wreaking havoc on important national programs is not new.  For a time,
Congress provided that challenges to federal statutes should be heard before a three-
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not be, the final word on the subject, but the district court’s institu-
tional limitations render it unlikely to add substantial value to the sub-
sequent review to be conducted by the court of appeals (which will be
de novo vis-a`-vis the district court).  Rather than lodging initial review
in an inappropriate forum, it would make more sense simply to curtail
district court jurisdiction, further shifting cases toward appellate
courts.140
Although Congress is ultimately responsible for allocating juris-
diction and could make some beneficial statutory adjustments, courts
can play a role at the margins.  When the law is unclear, courts should
inform their jurisdictional decisions by considering the normative
grounds disfavoring district court review.  Such opportunities arise,
for instance, in disputes over whether ambiguous jurisdictional stat-
utes contemplate review in the district court or court of appeals for
some type of administrative action.141  Less obviously, choices about
the allocation of jurisdiction sometimes arise in cases involving ripe-
ness and related doctrines surrounding the availability of pre-enforce-
ment review.  In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme Court
endorsed a generous version of reviewability, allowing regulated enti-
ties to seek review of new agency regulations before they were applied
in an enforcement action.142  Some later cases take a narrower view of
the availability of pre-enforcement review.143  The Court’s decisions
about the availability of pre-enforcement review do not involve only
the question of timing (though timing is certainly important).  More
judge district court, and that legislation was largely triggered by what Congress per-
ceived as hostility to the New Deal by some injunction-wielding district judges. See
Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 610–19 (1938).
140 This recommendation is not limited to cases that present themselves purely as
challenges to agency statutory interpretation.  In the wild, suits challenging agency
action often mix together various grounds of complaint: the agency violated the stat-
ute’s clear terms under Chevron Step One, the agency did not interpret the statute
reasonably at Step Two, the agency shifted course without adequate justification, the
agency was arbitrary and capricious in its weighing of the facts and alternative
approaches, etc.  As noted above, competence to address all of those claims is typically
lowest at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy. See supra subsection I.B.6.
141 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405 & n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (citing functional considerations such as uniformity and comparative
expertise in construing a statute so as to vest jurisdiction in the court of appeals); cf.
Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1186, 1195 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting functional
arguments for lodging jurisdiction in the court of appeals but explaining that the
jurisdictional statute clearly provided for review in the district court).
142 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
143 E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994); Reno v. Catholic
Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
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pertinently for our purposes, these decisions are also sometimes
choices about forum, such as where post-enforcement review is statu-
torily channeled to the court of appeals but a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge, if permitted, would be filed in the district court.144  This
Article’s arguments against district court jurisdiction thus provide
some qualified and indirect support to decisions narrowing pre-
enforcement review, at least in those cases with forum implications.145
Were Congress to further reduce the role of district courts in
reviewing agency action, such legislation should not encounter consti-
tutional objections.  As discussed, Congress has already bypassed the
district courts in many administrative cases,146 and its constitutional
authority over the lower courts empowers it to curtail their jurisdic-
tion still further.147
To be clear, the recommendation to curtail district court jurisdic-
tion does not apply to every type of case.  Some cases should stay in
the district court.  The fact-finding and case-development functions of
a trial court would be needed, for instance, in ordinary civil suits
between private parties that implicate agency interpretations, as well
as in other cases in which there is no prior administrative record.148
144 See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U.S. at 205–09 (concluding that provisions for
challenging agency enforcement actions in the court of appeals precluded suits seek-
ing pre-enforcement review in the district court).
145 Perhaps better still, given that pre-enforcement review is often valuable, would
be for Congress to modify the jurisdictional statutes so as to more reliably provide for
pre-enforcement review in the court of appeals (as opposed to the status quo in which
statutory interactions and gaps sometimes leave the cases in the district court). See
supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
146 See supra subsection II.A.2.
147 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (1 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850) (setting forth a broad
statement of congressional power over the jurisdiction of the lower courts).  A deci-
sion to divest both district courts and the courts of appeals of jurisdiction would pre-
sent more serious difficulties.  Divesting all the lower federal courts of jurisdiction to
review agency action might mean the absence of all judicial review.  First, the state
courts, the availability of which one can usually assume, would be unattractive agents
for supervising federal officials. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 402–08 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing limits on state
court authority over federal officials).  Second, the U.S. Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction does not appear to encompass suits seeking initial review of administrative
action. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–76 (1803) (holding that
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction did not extend to mandamus action against
Secretary of State); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judi-
cial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 742 n.472 (2004).
148 A difficult case is presented by the “citizen suit” provisions found, among other
places, in some environmental laws.  These provisions, which allow private parties to
enforce the statutes against private parties or the government, lodge jurisdiction in
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b. Implementing Deference Through Voting Rules and
Related Structures
Another non-doctrinal method of implementing hierarchically
variable deference is to change the voting rules in lower courts in
cases challenging agency action.  This idea builds on and modifies a
proposal by Gersen and Vermeule.149  Instead of asking whether the
agency’s view represents a reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute
(as under current deference doctrine), Gersen and Vermeule would
have judges ask whether the agency’s reading is correct—but the
agency would be upheld unless a supermajority of the judges found
the agency’s view incorrect (e.g., 6–3 on the Supreme Court, 3–0 in
the courts of appeals).150  That is, hardwired voting rules can operate
as a (possibly more efficacious) substitute for doctrines of
deference.151
Gersen and Vermeule’s idea can be adapted so as to achieve hier-
archically variable deference.  Although they support the use of
supermajority rules on all multi-member courts, an alternative is to
apply the supermajority rule only to the courts of appeals—requiring
the district courts. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) (Endangered Species Act); 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) (Clean Air Act).  In some instances, the district court forum
is necessary in order to produce a factual record, such as when the plaintiff accuses a
private party of violating the law in the absence of agency proceedings.  In other
instances, however, jurisdiction in the district court seems superfluous and arguably
inappropriate, as when a suit challenges the validity of an agency regulation or other
on-the-record action. See, e.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing &
§ 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (reviewing a rule listing polar
bears as a threatened species), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Defenders of the
Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989) (reviewing a regulation concern-
ing territorial scope of Endangered Species Act), aff’d sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife
v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
149 Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.
676 (2007).
150 Id. My brief comments in this subsection are not meant as a comprehensive
defense of converting deference into a voting rule.  Rather, the point is to show how
such a proposal could be adapted so as to implement hierarchical variation.  For criti-
cisms of Gersen and Vermeule’s proposal, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should
Not Be Converted into a Voting Rule: A Response to Gersen and Vermeule’s Proposal, 116 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 248 (2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Costs of Voting Rule Chev-
ron: A Comment on Gersen and Vermeule’s Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 238
(2007).
151 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 149, at 679, 684–86; cf. Evan H. Caminker,
Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past,
78 IND. L.J. 73, 98 (2003) (observing, in the context of constitutional review by the
Supreme Court, that “one can calibrate judicial review’s degree of deference either
through internalized norms operating on individual Justices, or through external
rules governing the corporate aggregation of individual votes, or through both”).
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unanimous panels to overturn an agency interpretation—while leav-
ing majority voting in place in the Supreme Court.152  Variations on
this approach would manipulate other structural features of the
reviewing court, such as panel size (e.g., requiring a 4-1 vote on an
expanded court of appeals panel).153  One could also combine
approaches, requiring the court of appeals to employ both doctrinal
deference (as today) and a supermajority voting rule.154  In other
words, the court of appeals could overturn an agency interpretation
only if all the judges on the panel determined that the agency’s view
conflicted with the clear text (or otherwise failed the relevant defer-
ence test).
2. Doctrinal Approaches
In addition to implementing deference through structure, one
could modify doctrine in a hierarchically variable way.  This subsec-
tion describes several doctrinal options and then addresses how to rec-
oncile doctrinal variation with competing values like simplicity and
workability.
a. Specific Doctrinal Modifications
Doctrinal implementation is probably not as simple as just telling
a particular court to defer more (or less).  Consider the Chevron doc-
trine.  That doctrine, or at least important parts of it, does not appear
to lend itself to easy calibration.  Under Chevron, the Step One inquiry
is whether Congress has directly resolved the question at issue.155  If
Congress has done so, there is no room to defer to an agency view that
contradicts Congress’s determination.  If we understand Step One as
an independent judicial inquiry into statutory meaning that precedes
consideration of the agency’s position,156 then it would seem difficult
152 Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 149, at 723 (noting the possibility of
“mixed voting rules” but endorsing supermajority rules for all courts).
153 Aside from effects on the level of deference, enlarging panels increases ideo-
logical diversity and might thereby suppress the politicized decisionmaking that one
can find on homogenous panels. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized
Judicial Review in Administrative Law: Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
319, 355–61 (2012).
154 Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 149, at 693 (noting the possibility of such a
combined approach).
155 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984); supra text accompanying notes 12–14 (describing the Chevron framework).
156 That does seem to be the most common way to understand it. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 998–99 (1992) (inter-
preting Chevron in this manner, and criticizing this sequential aspect of the doctrine).
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to implement heightened deference at that stage.  Heightened defer-
ence could come into play only if the court reaches Step Two, in
which the court considers whether the agency’s position is a reasona-
ble response to the statutory ambiguity or gap identified at Step
One.157  But if the inquiry reaches Step Two, the agency is already
likely to win.
Of course, one could try to reformulate or reconceptualize Chev-
ron in a way that makes it easier to calibrate levels of deference.  For
example, we could jettison the two-step framework and understand
Chevron as asking just one question about the degree of fit between
the agency’s interpretation and the court’s own assessment of the best
reading.158  This conceptualization treats Chevron as a matter of
degrees rather than as an on-off switch of statutory ambiguity.  A
highly deferential version of this conceptualization of Chevron would
correspond to accepting a looser degree of fit: the agency can stray
farther from the court’s preferred reading without being reversed.
Such a reformulation of Chevron would make it structurally similar to
the Skidmore doctrine, which already appears to be a doctrine of
degrees: the respect accorded the agency’s views under Skidmore can,
at least in theory, be continuously adjusted upward or downward as
the circumstances warrant.159
The basic limitation of implementing hierarchical variation in
the ways discussed in the preceding paragraph, whether under Chev-
ron or Skidmore, is that such efforts rely on verbal formulations that are
inherently vague, perhaps ineffable.160  What would it mean, as a prac-
But cf. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1164–65 (2012) (arguing that the
scope of the agency’s room to maneuver under the governing statute—i.e., its “Chev-
ron space”—might itself be influenced by agency views).
157 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
158 This approach is proposed in Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009).
159 Supra Section I.A (summarizing Skidmore doctrine).
160 Cf. Sch. Dist. of Wis. Dells v. Z.S. ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he cognitive limitations that judges share with other mortals may consti-
tute an insuperable obstacle to making distinctions any finer than that of plenary
versus deferential review.”); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 149, at 702 (“[T]he more
linguistic variants [on deference] one uses, the greater a morass the doctrinal
approach becomes.”).  In its broadest form, the worry about the power of mere verbal
formulations would challenge the efficacy of doctrinal modifications more generally.
Indeed, Zaring presents evidence showing that courts tend to reverse agencies at simi-
lar rates regardless of which official standard of review is employed.  Zaring, supra
note 11, at 169.  Those who are skeptical of doctrine may prefer to implement hierar-
chical deference through other means, such as jurisdiction or voting rules. See supra
subsection II.B.1.
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tical matter, to tell judges applying Chevron to give agencies “more
slack” or to let agency interpretations stand unless they are not just
unreasonable but “clearly unreasonable”?  Likewise, although the Skid-
more doctrine feels like a doctrine of degrees, it is hard to say how a
judge is supposed to operationalize an instruction to give an agency’s
view more weight rather than less.  An instruction to “be more per-
suaded” (or the opposite) is not very helpful.  Nor would it be easy to
tell if a court were complying with such a directive, which would make
it harder for the Supreme Court to monitor the lower courts.161  (At
the same time, the difficulty of assessing compliance does have a bene-
fit of a sort in that it allows the Supreme Court itself to be non-defer-
ential without officially announcing a departure from the lower
courts’ standards.)
There are, however, certain points in the doctrinal structure that
seem to provide a firmer toehold for hierarchical variation.  One
example of such an opening is Chevron “Step Zero,” the doctrine gov-
erning whether Chevron is the appropriate regime for a particular case
or whether some lesser deference regime like Skidmore applies.162
Speaking very generally, agency actions such as notice-and-comment
regulations or formal adjudications are usually eligible for Chevron,
while less formal types of agency guidance, such as interpretive guide-
lines or agency manuals, are not.163  Under a hierarchically variable
version of Step Zero, Chevron’s domain could be larger or smaller
depending on the court.  If one wished to ratchet up deference in the
lower courts, one could have Justice Scalia’s expansive view of Chev-
ron’s domain govern in the lower courts even as the Mead majority
opinion would govern in the Supreme Court.164  Or, instead, one
161 Like other bureaucratic managers, the Supreme Court has sought to adopt
policies that facilitate its ability to monitor its subordinates’ compliance. See Toby J.
Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2045, 2047–49
(2008); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 326, 339 (2007).
162 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (stating that an agency interpretation falls within
the domain of Chevron “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpre-
tation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
163 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31, 234; Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-
87 (2000).
164 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 241, 250–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Chevron applies to all “official” agency positions regardless of their format).  The
material in the text obviously does not provide a complete description of how broadly
to cast the net at Step Zero.  Agency materials are varied and diverse.  Regarding the
situation presented in Mead, one might hesitate to direct courts to defer to all tariff
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could ratchet down deference in the Supreme Court by eliminating
Chevron at the Supreme Court level in favor of universal Skidmore
review.  That might sound radical, though it is arguably not far from
what the Supreme Court covertly does already.
Another channel for implementing hierarchical variation con-
cerns the interaction between judicial precedents and subsequent
agency interpretations.  Under the Brand X doctrine, agencies can
deviate from a prior judicial interpretation of the statute they adminis-
ter, so long as the prior judicial decision gave content to an ambigu-
ous statute or filled a gap rather than discerned the statute’s only valid
meaning.165  That is, if a court is merely choosing one point within a
zone of indeterminacy, the agency charged with implementing the
statute can choose a different point later, the judicial precedent not-
withstanding.166  As a matter of official doctrine, it seems that the
Brand X rule is supposed to apply regardless of which court issued the
precedent.167  Yet although Brand X is hard to assail when it comes to
lower court interpretations—making them binding would seriously
restrict agency flexibility168—the argument for Brand X is less compel-
ling when it comes to prior Supreme Court decisions.  In the relatively
few instances in which the prior judicial interpretation comes from
the Supreme Court, the decision is nationally uniform and, as com-
pared to lower-court decisions, represents the result of an expert and
politically legitimate national policymaking process.  If that judicial
interpretation is to be displaced, it can and should be Congress that
does it—or at least one could plausibly so argue.  Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself might find this line of reasoning persuasive, for
it seems less eager to apply Brand X to trump its own precedents as
opposed to lower court precedents.169  Thus, the argument offered
classification rulings, given that such rulings were issued from offices all over the
country and in huge numbers. See id. at 233 (majority opinion).  However, on the
facts of Mead itself, there was a Headquarters ruling (and later, the Solicitor General’s
brief), which fares better in terms of expertise, national scope, and deliberation. Id.
at 224–25; id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982–83 (2005).
166 See id.
167 The concurrence by Justice Stevens can be read to mean that the Brand X rule
would not necessarily apply in the case of a prior Supreme Court precedent, id. at
1003 (Stevens, J., concurring), but the majority opinion spoke generally of “courts”
and did not draw any such distinction. Id. at 982–83 (majority opinion).
168 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836,
1842–44 (2012) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Brand X); id. at 1847 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (accusing the plurality of
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here might operate as a justification for actual unacknowledged prac-
tices as much as a call for reform.  In any event, the more general
point is that we need not adopt a one-court-fits-all approach to the
constraining force of judicial precedent.  Agencies could retain
greater room for dynamic interpretation as against the lower courts
than as against the Supreme Court.
As a final example of a point of entry for variable deference, con-
sider the “order of operations” that courts follow when interpreting
regulatory statutes.  There is a vigorous debate over how various judi-
cial interpretive tools ought to interact with deference to agencies.  Of
particular interest is the question whether Chevron takes precedence
over the policy-based or “substantive” canons, such as the presump-
tion against preemption or the rule that statutes ought to be inter-
preted to avoid serious constitutional difficulties.170  For instance, if
an agency interprets a statutory ambiguity in a way that seems textually
plausible, such that the interpretation would ordinarily prevail under
Chevron, will the agency’s interpretation nonetheless fail if it would
bring the statute-as-construed closer to the constitutional line than a
court would prefer to venture were it interpreting independently?171
Although the courts have mostly (though not unswervingly) held that
the avoidance canon trumps Chevron,172 some commentators criticize
that position.173  Merrill and Hickman, for example, believe that the
avoidance canon is problematic in administrative cases because it
shifts subconstitutional policymaking away from agencies (Congress’s
“evad[ing] Brand X”); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts
Court: The First Four Years, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 69, 174, 186 (2010) (noting the Court’s
apparent reluctance to apply Brand X to its own precedents).
170 See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Adminis-
trative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66–84 (2008) (discussing the problem of how to
integrate substantive canons and agency deference).
171 If the agency interpretation is actually unconstitutional, then of course it is
invalid.  The canon of constitutional avoidance, as it is usually now understood,
requires only doubts about an interpretation’s constitutionality. See, e.g., Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise seri-
ous constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”);
John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495,
1495–97 (1997) (distinguishing between different versions of the avoidance canon).
172 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574–88 (applying the avoidance
canon and rejecting the agency’s interpretation).
173 See generally Jonathan D. Urick, Note, Chevron and Constitutional Doubt, 99 VA.
L. REV. 375 (2013) (summarizing judicial precedents and scholarly views on this
matter).
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preferred delegate) toward unaccountable courts.174  Whether or not
Merrill and Hickman are right for all courts, their argument is cer-
tainly stronger when it comes to lower courts.  The debate over the
order of interpretive operations need not yield a single answer for
every court.
b. Doctrinal Heterogeneity and Complexity Tradeoffs
The rationales supporting deference have greater force as one
moves down the judicial pyramid, and thus a regime of variable defer-
ence would better align judicial practice with the rationales for defer-
ence.  Still, no rule perfectly fits its underlying justifications, and one
cannot implement a regime of doctrinal variation without weighing
countervailing systemic considerations that militate in favor of homo-
geneity, such as the value of simplicity and the need to maintain a
workable system of appellate review.
Although the Supreme Court has by its own account not treated
simplicity as the overriding goal in this field,175 it is true that, were all
else equal, simple doctrine would be preferable to complex doctrine.
The theory of hierarchical variation would seem to take us in the
wrong direction in that regard, but that impression is at most only
partly true.  Depending on the precise mode of implementation,
lower courts might use Chevron more and Skidmore less, the Supreme
Court might not follow Brand X, and so forth.  But that simply
changes which standards apply rather than multiplying the number of
standards any given court applies.  Further, any particular court’s task
could actually become simpler under a heterogeneous regime if the
tests it applied in the new regime were themselves simpler.176  That is,
court-level complexity could decrease even if system-level complexity
increases.
As to system-level complexity, if one were really serious about “tai-
lor[ing] deference to variety,”177 one could imagine a dauntingly com-
plex world in which every court, even every judge, had a distinct
standard of review.  Yet perfect tailoring is obviously not the only con-
sideration, just as simplicity is not the sole aim either; the goal is to
174 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 915; see also William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 867–98
(2001) (arguing that the avoidance canon interferes with executive power).
175 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001) (observing that the
Court has chosen “to tailor deference to variety” rather than “to limit and simplify”).
176 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
347, 355–58 (2003) (advocating global Chevron review and criticizing Mead as too
complex and costly for lower courts to administer).
177 Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
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achieve an optimal balance of the relevant values.  It is hard to know
where exactly to strike the balance, but it seems pretty clear that opti-
mal tailoring would stop short of specifying a different rule for every
judge.  Indeed, to preview a conclusion below, the optimal number of
distinct doctrinal regimes of administrative review might be just two:
one for the Supreme Court and one for everyone else.
A final point about complexity is that the added “procedural”
complexity of creating multiple standards of review could reduce the
“substantive” complexity of the law, if the new regime tends to reduce
circuit splits and the like.  Hierarchical heterogeneity thus involves
tradeoffs among different types of complexity.
c. Workability Revisited: Discretionary Jurisdiction and
Optimal Differentiation
As discussed earlier, one difficulty with having courts at different
levels in the hierarchy employ divergent standards of review is that
doing so threatens to create excessive appeals and wasteful litiga-
tion.178  One promising way to ameliorate that problem is to curtail
jurisdiction, but even if we were to reconfigure jurisdiction to some
degree, such as along the lines suggested above,179 it is safe to assume
that we are not going to see all the lower courts divested of jurisdic-
tion to review agency action, leaving the matter totally to the Supreme
Court.  Therefore, we are still confronted with the workability objec-
tion to hierarchical variation: if a reviewing court uses a standard of
review that differs from the standard applied in the court below it,
lower-court losers will appeal; many reversals will ensue.
This is a significant objection to doctrinal variation in a multi-
level judicial system, but there is a solution to it.  Suppose that we have
only two distinct standards: the Supreme Court employs a doctrine of
“low deference,” while the courts of appeals and the district courts (to
the extent the district courts still have jurisdiction) employ a doctrine
of “high deference.”  (The difference between the two standards
could be large or small, depending on one’s preferred doctrinal
implementation.) Within the lower courts, where district-court losers
typically have the right to have the court of appeals review their cases
on the merits, there would be no workability problem: even when a
case could be heard initially in the district court and then appealed to
the court of appeals, both courts would, as today, apply the same stan-
178 See supra subsection II.B.1.
179 Supra subsection II.B.1.a.
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dard of review.180  Within the lower courts, that is, the compelling
institutional need for workable review outweighs the argument for
doctrinal variation.  Hierarchical variation would, within the lower
courts, be implemented through jurisdiction rather than through
doctrine.
But wouldn’t the workability problem resurface higher up in the
system, because the lower courts’ “high deference” standard of review
would diverge from the Supreme Court’s “low deference” standard?
No, at least not in a serious way.  The Supreme Court’s docket is dis-
cretionary; it does not have to review every case, and in fact it reviews
very few.181  The Court’s ability to keep its docket small derives, in
part, from deference doctrines that lead lower courts to converge on
the nationally uniform interpretations issued by administrative agen-
cies rather than reach their own conflicting interpretations.182  If
lower courts maintained or increased their level of deference from the
status quo, there would be few instances in which the Supreme Court
would have to intervene in order to maintain the uniformity of
national regulatory law.183  Thus, there would not be much of a worka-
bility problem stemming from differing standards, for cases will ordi-
narily not be reviewed by courts applying differing standards: the
deference regime of the lower courts would be the only standard the
vast majority of cases would ever see.  In other words, discretionary
Supreme Court jurisdiction and doctrinal variation can complement
each other: the non-mandatory nature of the Supreme Court’s juris-
diction makes variation more workable, and the deferential standard
applied by the lower courts reduces the necessity (though not the
opportunity) for Supreme Court review.
In those rather few cases the Court does hear on the merits, it
would apply its own standards, which means that the Court would
180 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth’s Med. Ctr. of Bos., Inc. v. Thompson, 396 F.3d 1228,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that the circuit court “appl[ies] the same standard of
review as the district court”); Fishermen’s Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d 164, 168
(4th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e generally review the agency’s action from the same position as
that of the district court . . . .”).
181 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006); SUP. CT. R. 10.  There are only a few remnants of
mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRAC-
TICE 75–76, 89–117, 146–47 (9th ed. 2007).
182 See supra subsection I.B.4 (explaining how deference facilitates uniformity
without requiring constant Supreme Court intervention).
183 Other features of current law besides deference also reduce the risk of circuit
splits in administrative review cases.  Some statutes lodge jurisdiction to challenge
agency action exclusively in one court, often the D.C. Circuit. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.  In other instances, cases filed in multiple courts can be trans-
ferred and consolidated in one court.  28 U.S.C. § 2112(a).
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sometimes reverse even though the lower court showed proper defer-
ence (for that court) or affirm even though the lower court acted
improperly.  Those decisions need not be unduly awkward, and in fact
one can find existing models for those scenarios in cases in which the
Supreme Court overrules precedent that bound the lower court.
Because only the Supreme Court is authorized to overrule its prece-
dents, there are cases in which it reverses a lower court that had fol-
lowed (that is, showed the proper deference to) one of the Court’s
precedents.184  Likewise, the Court sometimes affirms a lower court
that had anticipated the overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision,
even if the lower court had exceeded its authority in doing so.185
Agency interpretations are just another sort of precedent, and these
cases show that the rationale that justifies the Court’s decision need
not be a rationale that is equally appropriate in the courts below.
One might wonder whether the courts, Congress, and other insti-
tutional players would be happy with such a system.  The question
whether various institutions have incentives to create a system like this
is discussed next.
3. Implementing Hierarchically Variable Deference
The argument of this Article, if it is found persuasive, shows that
there are good reasons for deference to vary hierarchically (Part I)
and that such a regime would be institutionally feasible and indeed
already to some degree exists (Part II).  How might further movement
in the direction of hierarchical variation come about?  Answering that
question requires us to consider the abilities of various institutions of
government to implement such changes, as well as whether they
would want to do so.  This is a complex topic, but some preliminary
points are in order.
To change the jurisdiction of the lower courts, such as by further
curtailing district court involvement, congressional action would be
needed.186  The fact that Congress has already removed the district
184 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997) (praising the lower
court for following precedent, then overruling that precedent and vacating and
remanding).
185 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484,
486 (1989) (criticizing the lower court for renouncing Supreme Court precedent but
overruling that precedent and affirming).
186 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (1 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850) (discussing broad
congressional authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); see also
supra subsection II.A.2 (discussing current patterns of jurisdictional allocation).
Although Congress defines jurisdiction by statute, the courts influence the allocation
of jurisdiction through their interpretations of unclear jurisdictional statutes and
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courts from many aspects of the administrative system suggests it
could be convinced to go further, especially where district court juris-
diction today is not the product of specific statutes selecting the dis-
trict court but instead arises, perhaps without any particular
congressional design, from the general federal-question statute.187
Curtailing district court jurisdiction would support values like uni-
formity and coherence by reducing the role of those entities whose
decisions are most likely to imperil those values.  In addition, it would
shift authority away from the courts with the least (pertinent) exper-
tise, the weakest claims to national policymaking authority, and, thus,
the least to contribute to the overall system of review.
Regarding modifications to doctrinal standards of review, two
institutions have the requisite power.188  Congress could prescribe def-
erence rules by statute,189 or the Supreme Court, which is largely
responsible for the current deference doctrines, could simply
announce new doctrines.190  As for Congress, its desires concerning
deference are complex.191  As regards hierarchical deference in par-
ticular, Congress probably has little in the way of actual preferences
their decisions on various reviewability doctrines. See supra text accompanying notes
141–45.
187 See supra note 134.
188 If hierarchical deference were implemented through voting rules, it is a bit
unclear which institution(s) could make that change.  Gersen and Vermeule argue
that both courts and Congress have the authority to impose supermajority voting
rules.  Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 149, at 725–30.
189 See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2639 (2003)
(noting broad agreement that Chevron can be modified by statute). See generally
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085 (2002) (discussing legislative power to modify canons of interpretation).  To be
sure, Congress’s power to mandate judicial deference could run up against limits
imposed by the nature of the Article III “judicial power” or by the nondelegation
principle. Id. at 2129–31.  Neither the jurisdictional restrictions nor the fairly modest
doctrinal adjustments discussed here should come very close to those boundaries.
190 One might question, from a formalist point of view, whether the Supreme
Court has the power to prescribe binding interpretive rules for the lower courts, espe-
cially if those rules vary from the rules the Court itself follows. See Bruhl, supra note 4,
at 485 n.162 (noting this objection and providing a response).
191 For discussions of the factors that should influence Congress’s preferences for
agency implementation versus judicial implementation of statutes, see, for example,
Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 368–80 (2010); Matthew C. Stephen-
son, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agen-
cies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1042–49 (2006).  For an empirical study of the
expectations of congressional drafters, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Dele-
gation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 990–1015 (2013).
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about such detailed questions of judicial administration (though its
jurisdictional choices do reveal some awareness of the issue).  Perhaps
the most we can say about congressional desires regarding deference
is that the Supreme Court develops standards of review based on
notions of sound institutional design, creating a set of baseline pre-
sumptions that Congress is free to alter if it wishes.192  As Part I shows,
the various arguments supporting judicial deference apply with partic-
ular force to lower courts.  If existing deference doctrine is satisfactory
to Congress—in the sense that Congress leaves it alone—hierarchi-
cally heterogeneous doctrine would probably be satisfactory too.
Given that Congress is unlikely to play an active role, we should
consider whether the Supreme Court would implement a hierarchi-
cally heterogeneous regime.  Such a regime would have a number of
attractions (which is why, again, the system may display some unoffi-
cial doctrinal heterogeneity already).  To the extent that the Supreme
Court would be (more) nondeferential, the Court would presumably
enjoy its freedom to exercise independent judgment and to do so
openly.  To the extent that lower courts would defer more, that
should both increase the rate at which agency interpretations are sus-
tained and reduce circuit splits.  These results would advance the
Court’s institutional interest in maintaining the uniformity of federal
regulatory law,193 as well as the Court’s more parochial interest in
increasing its control over its docket.194  Of course, the Court wants
some agency actions to be invalidated, either for neutral rule-of-law
reasons (e.g., the agency has strayed too far from the statute) or
because of ideological disagreement with the substance of the
agency’s policy.  Increased deference in the lower courts would mean
that more of those invalidations would have to come from the
Supreme Court itself.  That would be fine as long as the Court wished
192 See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 34, at 212 (“Chevron is a congressional
doctrine only in the sense that Congress can overturn it; in all other respects, Chevron
is a judicial construction, reflecting implicit policy judgments about what interpretive
practices make for good government.”).
193 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing cases involving conflicts on important matters of
federal law as candidates for review); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe R.R. Co., 516 U.S. 152, 156 (1996) (noting interest in uniform administra-
tion of regulatory scheme as a factor motivating grant of certiorari).
194 See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 669, 679 (2012) (remarking on the Court’s “power-
ful drive” to control its agenda and exercise “as much freedom as possible over what is
to be finally and authoritatively decided”); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643
(2000) (documenting the Supreme Court’s drive to establish discretionary control
over its docket—and expressing misgivings concerning the same).
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to invalidate relatively few agency actions, but it could be a problem
for the Court if it lacked the docket capacity to strike down as many as
it would like.  It is possible that the Court would respond to its capac-
ity constraints by modulating the required degree of lower-court def-
erence in light of the shifting ideological positions of the lower courts
and the administration.  For example, the Court might want lower
courts to engage in more searching review when the lower courts are
ideologically aligned with the Supreme Court but the administration
is not; conversely, the Court might demand more deference when the
Court is aligned with the agencies but the lower courts are not.  Per-
haps the Court already modifies its doctrine over time in response to
such considerations.195
An increase in the degree to which lower courts converge on pro-
agency decisions would admittedly impair the process of “percola-
tion,” which process the Court sometimes professes to find helpful.196
But percolation—which is essentially a period of uncertainty or con-
flict in the lower courts—is less valuable in the administrative context
than in others.  Here, values like uniformity and certainty have more
force, as Congress has recognized by creating agencies and the Court
has reinforced by requiring deference to their interpretations.197  Cur-
rent jurisdictional statutes likewise aim at reducing, to a degree, the
potential for conflicting decisions in the judicial review of agency
action.198
Finally, what of the lower courts’ preferences?  One might sup-
pose that they would oppose a regime of hierarchical deference if that
meant reducing their authority to overturn agency interpretations.
(Recall again that hierarchical variation need not take that form; one
195 This theory is most closely associated with Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L.
Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994).  For subse-
quent empirical tests, see Raso & Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1793–94 (finding support
for the theory), and Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political
Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 659–60
(2004) (casting doubt on the theory).
196 See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[The Court has] in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems
are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and fed-
eral appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pro-
nouncement by this Court.”).
197 See Strauss, supra note 70, at 1105, 1121–22; see also Douglas v. Indep. Living
Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (referring to the risk that permitting
multiple lawsuits to proceed under non-deferential standards would “defeat the uni-
formity that Congress intended by centralizing administration of the federal program
in the agency”).
198 See supra note 183 (discussing consolidation and exclusive jurisdiction).
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could leave the lower courts alone and change the Supreme Court’s
practices.)  Most people like wielding power, and this proposal could
take some of the lower courts’ power away.  Nonetheless, the calcula-
tion facing the lower courts is not quite that simple.  Remember that
they do not have the luxury of the Supreme Court’s discretionary
docket.  Complex administrative cases are, for the lower courts, a bur-
den as well as a policymaking opportunity; certainly the cases are not
hand-picked opportunities.  If more deference makes for less work, as
it plausibly does,199 the lower courts might welcome the relief.  The
freed-up time and resources could be allocated to other cases, to lei-
sure, or to whatever the judges most prefer.  If lower courts would not
resist, the Supreme Court would not need to invest much effort in
ensuring compliance.200
CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT COURTS, DIFFERENT ROLES
Despite the complexity that characterizes the law of judicial
review of agency action, uniformity and simplicity have prevailed in at
least one respect: whatever standard of review governs a particular
case, all courts are supposed to apply the same one.  Yet there is noth-
ing inevitable about having a homogeneous judicial system in which
all courts follow the same rules.  Courts vary in their institutional com-
petencies and circumstances.  Because the justification for deference
derives largely from institutional considerations, deference doctrine
should heed institutional differences between various courts.  Gener-
ally speaking, lower courts should defer to agencies more strongly than
should higher courts.  Sometimes that means different courts should
employ somewhat different doctrines, though, as we have seen, hierar-
chical differences can also be expressed through non-doctrinal means
such as jurisdictional allocations.
The theory of hierarchical deference contemplates a system of
judicial review that is composed of two types of courts with somewhat
differentiated roles:  the one Supreme Court and then everyone else
(to the extent that district courts remain involved at all).  It thus rec-
ognizes, and further reinforces, the fact that the Supreme Court is not
199 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
200 When lower courts fail to follow the proper standards or methodologies, but
the case does not otherwise merit plenary Supreme Court review, the Court could
summarily vacate and remand for application of the correct standard. Cf. Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 458 (2006) (vacating and remanding where the
court of appeals misstated the law, even though the judgment below “may be correct
in the final analysis”); Dan De Farms, Inc. v. Sterling Farm Supply, Inc., 633 N.W.2d
824, 824 (Mich. 2001) (vacating and remanding where the lower court considered
legislative history without first finding the statute ambiguous).
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just another court.  As Robert Dahl put it, emphasizing one aspect of
the Court’s distinctive character, the Supreme Court is not only a
legal institution but “also a political institution, an institution, that is
to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of national
policy.”201  Some commentators have expressed misgivings concern-
ing the development of an Olympian Supreme Court that stands far
removed from the more ordinary courts it supervises,202 and those
worries should not lightly be dismissed.  My proposal admittedly envi-
sions functional differentiation and separation, but I regard that as
appropriate given that various courts in fact have quite distinct com-
petencies.  In any event, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court is
poised—in administrative law or elsewhere—to descend from its peak
and rejoin its non-supreme peers.  It is time for the law to catch up.
201 Dahl, supra note 61, at 279.
202 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower
Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 992–1015
(2000); Hartnett, supra note 194, at 1644, 1713–30; Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken
Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 432–38.
